For my parents

SECULARIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: THE CASE OF TURKEY

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

June 2001

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ABSTRACT

SECULARIZATION and INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

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Traditional realist and structural neorealist approaches to international relations have largely made a "secularization assumption" by approaching states as static givens without looking at the ways in which states have become constructed as "secular." States' adoption of secularization differs according to domestic context and often creates tensions through the reconstruction of "religion." In the Turkish context, the construction of new politics and an apolitical religious sphere were central elements in the building of a Turkish nation state. This reconstruction, however, occurred at the particular expense of non-Muslims in the republic, whose religious difference became reconstructed as national difference. The purpose of this study is to suggest a constructivist framework for interpreting secularization, to trace its development in the Turkish state, and to ascertain its implications for non-Muslims in the republic.

Keywords: International Relations Theory, Religion, Secularization, Secularism, Turkey.

ÖZET

LAİKLEŞME ve ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER TEORİSİ: TÜRKİYE

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Masters, Uluslar arası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Haziran 2001

Geleneksel realist ve yapısalcı (neorealist) uluslararası ilişkiler yaklaşımları statik verilenler olarak laikleşme varsayımı'nda bulunmuşlar ve devletlerin nasıl 'laik' olarak inşa edildiklerini araştırmamışlardır. Devletlerin laikleşmeyi benimsemesi ülkenin iç ortamına göre değişiklik göstermekte ve dinin yeniden inşası ile gerginlikler yaramaktadır. Türkıye bağlamında yeni bir siyaset ve apolitik dini alanın inşası Türkiye milli devletinin kurulmasında temel unsurlar olmuşlardır. Ancak bu yeniden inşa devletteki müslüman olmayan unsurların aleyhine olmuş, dini farklılıklar milliyet farklılığı olarak ortaya konmuştur. Bu çalışmanın amacı laikleşmeyı yorumlamak, Türkiye devleti içindeki gelişimini takip etmek ve devletteki müsülman olmayanlara etkilerini belirlemek ve konstruktivist bir çerçeve örnermektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslar arası İlişkiler Teorisi, Din, Laikleşme, Laiklik, Türkiye.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Gulnur Aybet, my thesis supervisor, for her all of her help and flexibility as I prepared this thesis.

Conversations and a course with Scott Pegg contributed to the theoretical component and Pinar Bilgin's careful read of the final draft was also very valuable. Conversations with Murat Cemrek deepened my understanding of Islam in Turkey.

Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Nurcan Atalan for all of her valuable insight, for proofreading, translating, and photocopying, and most importantly for her patience and support along the way.

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INTRODUCTION

How are religion and international relations related? The answer is not a simple one. Generally, we understand the two to be very separate spheres of life that have very little to do with one another. Whereas international relations broadly describes the international behavior of states, religion is usually understood as something relating to societies, groups, or individuals within a given state. That is, religion is not generally understood as involving international relations, nor are international relations usually understood as containing a religious component. They are, in short, understood as separate and distinct social phenomena. This separation and distinction requires a reformulation of the original question: Why then are religion and international relations *not* related? The answer to this question is at once epistemological and derived from the world in which we live.

In epistemological terms, the ways in which we "write" international relations very often excludes religion from mattering. International relations, as it is traditionally understood, concerns issues of states in an international system and their strategic balancing behavior. International relations may even involve economic aspects. In all of these scenarios, with few exceptions, the state is assumed to be an important actor. Even in some newer approaches which introduce other actors than the state (such as non-governmental organizations) the role of the state is acknowledged (even if in the future it is subject to change). Thus, the state occupies a crucial role in how we perceive the world and the way in which we define international relations. Conversely, religion seems to be something very distinct from the behavior of states. It is something "personal," "spiritual," and unrelated to the

operation of modern states. In short, the state occupies a fundamental starting point of international relations in a way that religion does not.

Likewise, the way we understand international relations is largely derived from the world we live in. The political hegemony of statehood entails that "other forms of political community have been rendered almost unthinkable."[1] Political, economic, legal and even social relations are defined to a greater extent by states than by religion. Likewise, a large portion of the world (especially those who write international relations) live in societies in which state and religion have some sort of formal separation. The ways in which religion is separated will, of course, vary from state to state. Nonetheless, a fundamental characteristic of contemporary world politics (certainly after the nineteenth century) is the significance of the state as a building block of international relations. In our contemporary world, we more often attribute power to states than we do to religion.

However, this thesis attempts to provide an alternative answer to the relation of religion and international relations: Rather than suggesting that religion is something "different" than the state, I propose that both modern international relations and modern religion are both products of state-centric epistemology and experience.[2]

Like traditional international relations, I take the state as my point of departure because of its prominent position at the both domestic and international levels. Unlike

[1] R.B.J. Walker, "The Subject of Security," in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 73

[2] The meaning of "modern" is a complex notion that has received a great deal of attention in academic circles. In this thesis, I understand "modern" to be closely linked to *attitudes* in particular but also policies that developed in the post-Enlightenment West (but have become adopted outside the West as well) emphasizing change, progress, rationality, and science as positive and universal developments. By "modern politics" or "modern international relations" I wish to suggest new political arrangements focused around the nation state and corresponding international system. By "modern religion" I wish to suggest the development of "religion" as a universal anthropological category being "apolitical" in form (see chapter 1).

traditional scholarship, I challenge the "state" both as a given or the only referent object for international relations. New approaches to international relations have challenged the "neutrality" of the state in terms of both theory and practice both by suggesting that the way that the state has been conceptually constructed reflects certain conceptual biases;[3] or by arguing that the existence of a state in some contexts inherently acts as sources of insecurity for its citizens.[4] This thesis will analyze the neutrality of the state by exploring the way that the construction of the state impacts religious identity. As such, this analysis indirectly acts as a challenge to the argument that religious identity is marginal to the study of international relations. It has been suggested that identity and the state are linked in at least three ways: in affecting states prospect for survival, the modal character of statehood in the international system over time and the character of statehood within a given period.[5] Additionally, it is necessary to consider the way that the adoption of statehood is equally constitutive of identity and the effects of interstate relations on religious identity.

To put the issue in other terms, "being" an actor in the modern international system means being a state. The adoption of statehood at the international level, however, involves the expectation to be like other states, to become "functionally similar" in relations with other states. Thus, the adoption of statehood involves a reconstruction of identity as a modern state. This oftentimes has implications for religion by redefining its scope (often as apolitical, spiritual, or private). Religion is very often separated, subordinated or rewritten in some way in conformity with

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[3]J. Anne Tickner, "A Critique of Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism" in R.C. Art and R. Jervis, eds. *International Politics and Contemporary Issues.* (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1996).

4 K.J. Holsti, "International Relations Theory and Domestic War in the Third World: The Limits of Relevance," in Stephanie G. Neuman, ed., *International Relations Theory and the Third World*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

statehood. This process, by which religion is reconstructed as a distinct social sphere in terms of the state, can be called "secularization." However, just as statehood is constructed differently in a variety of contexts, so too will the reconstruction of religion assume different forms. Moreover, the process of secularization is not simply a "neutral" process, but has rather has profound implications for existing social relations.

Thus, this thesis is divided into three chapters:

The first chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual overview of religion and international relations. It shows how international relations' traditional focus on the state has excluded religion from mattering and how this reflects a particularly Western *weltanschauung.* Despite its Western roots, a secularization norm of statehood has become an almost universal international governing state identity, albeit acquiring radically different significance in different contexts.

The second chapter provides an example of secularization by looking at the case of Turkey. The Turkish case is interesting for several reasons. First, its historical experience situates it both within and outside the experiences of the "first" and "third" worlds. Second, Turkey's rapid attempt to construct a modern nation state in Western terms is well documented. Third, Turkey's official identity as "secular" (as evident in both official discourse and policy) allows one to isolate "secularization" as a distinct variable. Ultimately, Turkey's particular adoption of statehood and continuous reorganization of religion and politics show how secularization is neither a static, nor singular process.

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5 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

The final chapter attempts to "deepen" the argument of the second chapter by shedding light on how the reconstruction of Turkish state identity as secular should not be understood as a "neutral" process but as necessarily occurring at the expense of existing social relations. It does this by analyzing the case of non-Muslim religious groups in Turkey and their experiences of Turkish secularization in the state's formative period.

CHAPTER ONE

Religion and International Relations Theory:

The Significance of the State

> If throughout our history religion has developed (to a large extent, with some other influences at play) a revolution in social values and has given birth by scissiparity, as it were, to an autonomous world political institutions and speculations, then surely religion itself will have changed in the process. […]Everyone knows that religion was formerly a matter of the group and has become a matter of the individual. . . . But if we go on to assert that this change is correlated with the birth of the modern State, the proposition is not such a commonplace as the previous.[6]

Introduction

Religion has proven to be an enduring challenge for social sciences. This is perhaps quite unsurprising because social sciences have often based themselves in positivist, rationalist and secular assumptions, which have largely assumed that religion would remain a marginal social phenomenon. The marginality of religion has certainly been the case for the discipline of international relations. To an important extent, religion (and identity, more generally) has been considered marginal to the way that international relations operates, particularly under the dominance of traditional realism and structural neorealism. International relations have been defined as relations between *states* in material (non-ideational) terms. Religion, largely lacking a significant causal mechanism for states at the international level, has generally been dismissed as a significant focus of study in traditional scholarship.

[6] Louis Dumont in Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 27 -28

Recent scholarship has nonetheless witnessed a renewed interest in religion. A variety of scholars have, each in his/ her own way, directly challenged the proposition that religion would remain an insignificant or marginal social phenomenon unworthy of academic study.[7] As insightful as some of these approaches may be, they prove conceptually problematic. From the perspective of international relations scholarship, these approaches' particular focuses on "society" (or in the case of Huntington, "civilizations") are analytically distinct from international relations' traditional emphases on the "state" or relations between states, rendering these approaches difficult to apply conceptually to international relations scholarship.

Moreover, the approaches mentioned above largely suggest a similar paradigm, which suggests (1.) an initial, prototypical religious society, followed by (2.) a secular society imported from the West, especially under the auspices of Colonialism and/or the Cold world, and finally (3.) a religious resurgence entailing either a new religious society or some sort of modern/ pre-modern synthesis. Mark Juergensmeyer's assertion that

> [t]he new world order that is replacing the biploar powers of the old Cold War is characterized not only by the rise of new economic forces, a crumbling of old empires, and the discrediting of communism, but also by the resurgence of parochial identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances[8]

is characteristic of a larger trend in international relations scholarship. In other words, the most common way of dealing with international relations' traditional neglect of identity issues such as religion (both by religiously sympathetic and secularly minded scholars) has been simply to "squeeze" such issues into traditional scholarship. A very common argument has been that whereas religion did not matter previously, in the

[7] See for example, Gilles Kepel, *The Revenge of God, The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations" Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993). Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

post-Cold War era it will play an increasingly significant role.[9] Another approach, such as John Esposito and John Voll imply, suggests that theories which took secularism for granted were to an important extent "wrong" about the way they described the world. Religion rather than disappearing as prominent theories suggest has reemerged as a force of strong social significance relevant to understanding the contemporary world.[10] Both approaches (that of Juergensmeyer and that of Esposito) imply a rather simplistic interpretation of the role of religion in society: at any given time, religion either matters or it does not.

However, such simplistic categorization is problematic because neither "religion" nor its lack has enjoyed complete hegemony over state or society at any given time. In other words, "secularization" should not be perceived as an all or nothing phenomenon, something that simplistically be proven or disproven. In fact, religion and secularism (the terms that is often used to describe religion's absence from politics), rather than being understood as dichotomous and opposing social phenomenon, are part of larger and similar social processes related to the building of modern states and its construction of modern identity. Similarly, religion has not "reemerged" in the post-Cold war era, but has in fact always occupied a position alongside the state, albeit in complex and changing ways. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the fact that all states have developed religious policies albeit quite diverse ones suggests that religion, far from being simply "marginal" has in fact always been a matter of state concern. My contention is precisely that the building of modern states involves the simultaneous construction of separated spheres of politics and

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[8] Mark Juergensmeyer, *op cit.*, , p. 1

[9] See also Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Ole Waever, "In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies,* vol. 29, no. 3 (2000), p. 705.

[10] John Esposito and John Voll, "Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue." *Millenium,* vol. 29, no. 3 (2000), p. 614

religion. Thus, in contrast to theories suggesting religion as a sphere inherently divorced from the state, I argue that the construction of the modern state both necessitates and is contingent upon the construction of a religious sphere framed in terms of the state.

Moreover, the attempt to "squeeze" religion into existing international relations scholarship, particularly that of neorealist persuasion, does not in fact expand our understanding of international relations, but rather subjects religion to an existing paradigm which makes important assumptions of the role of religion, politics, and the state. This is analogous to Keith Krause and Michael Williams' distinction between "broadening" versus "deepening" the definition of security studies. Simply "broadening" international relations to include new issues (such as the environment or religious conflict) does not in itself "deepen" our understanding of what constitutes international relations or what international relations are, which would involve expanding such understanding to include other levels of analysis. Thus, it is necessary to "deepen" our understanding of what we understand international relations to be by examining the way that religion has been traditionally excluded as an appropriate referent for international relations scholarship.

In sum, I will argue that the development of modern statehood is *inherently* related to developments in religion, as we shall later see in the example of the Turkish state. The construction of the modern state has involved the construction of a religious sphere framed in terms of the modern state. I do not wish to suggest that religious space or religion is simply a product of the modern state, but rather that the construction of modern politics and religion *coincide* with the construction of a state-centric social order. At the same time, there is tendency in international relations scholarship to conceptualize the state as strictly "political" without recognizing the

implications of such a development for religious identity. Accordingly, a common argument has emphasized that religion does not matter for the (political) state, without considering the reason for its "lack of significance". To put the issue in different terms, the construction of the state as represented in traditional international relations scholarship, rather than being divorced from religion, has in fact espoused an identity politics with profound implications for religion. Yet, it is important to recognize that the secularization of states (or as Waltz prefers, their "functional similarity") should not be perceived as an objective, inevitable or singular process since understandings of the religious and the political have been framed differently within different states based on domestic context. Thus, a certain paradox is to be observed: on the one hand, states have almost universally adopted notions of "religious" and "political" in the process of state-building often radically transforming traditional social organization; on the other hand, states' definitions of religious and political and especially the lines that distinguish them vary so significantly that a singular relationship between them cannot be discerned.

Problematizing the State as a Level of Analysis in International Relations Scholarship

In traditional international relations scholarship, the "state" has prevailed as analytically distinct, and-- indeed-- the appropriate level of analysis for understanding international relations. International relations scholarship's focus on and conceptualizations of the state have profoundly affected the study of religion and international relations in several ways.

Religion has largely been *assumed* simply not to matter for international relations. Hans Morgenthau, a foundational thinker in the field, has explicitly assumed

that "religious" issues remain separate from the study of international relations. Indeed, he argues that "religious man" should never be confused with "political man" who constantly strives for power.[11] For Morgenthau, politics must be regarded "as an autonomous sphere of action and [understood] apart from other spheres" including religion.[12] Not only is "political man" separate from, for example, "moral man " or "religious man,"[13] there is an "ineluctable tension between the moral command the requirements of successful political action."[14] Thus, any attempt to consider them together subjects both to confusion.

Though less explicit than Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz likewise suggests that religion, as an identity issue, is a marginal issue for international relations. [15] For Waltz, the particular composition of individual states matters less for international relations than the composition of the international system. In contrast to the hierarchical organization of domestic politics, entailing specification of distinct roles and functions, international politics is inherently anarchic in its composition of similar units (states) without a single overarching organizational principle, causing all states to focus efforts on their primary aim: survival. Thus, Waltz concludes that competitive international anarchic structure at the level of the international system forces states to become functionally similar and unitary actors. In other words, whatever difference there may be within states at a societal level such as religion simply do not matter for international relations because, at an international level, states are forced to deal with similar threats and strategic concerns. Likewise, Stephen

[11] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 16
[12] *Ibid,* p. 5
[13] *Ibid,* p. 15
[14] *Ibid,* p. 12
[15] Kenneth Waltz, *Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

Walt-- who even goes beyond Waltz's insistence on structures to include some ideational "threats" such as ethnic conflict-- argues that the expansion of international relations, particularly security studies, to include new issues rather than states and their situations of war, destroys the coherence of the discipline.[16]

Similarly, traditional emphasis on *material* forces has excluded religion from mattering for international relations among states. For Waltz, structures and units are defined in material (non-ideational) terms. Such a definition, however, lends itself to a variety of criticisms, such as Alexander Wendt's argument that anarchy by itself does not directly cause or define international relations, but rather what matters is the social structure of anarchy-- the meaning that has been endowed to anarchy through practice. [17] Regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of Waltz's descriptive portrayal of the international system and the behavior of states in such a system, such an approach contains profound implications for the study of religion. Foremost, by defining structure and unit in material terms, ideational and other non-material forces including religion are inherently excluded from mattering for international relations. If international anarchy, material forces, and the balancing activities of states are what matter for international relations, the necessary implication for religion is that it simply is not important.

Moreover, religion is particularly excluded from mattering for international relations because, as a consequence of the modern construction of religion, religion lacks a direct causal relationship motivating state behavior in the international system. According to a definition such as Stephen Walt's, religion only matters if it affects the behavior of the state in the international system. If religion does not provide such a

[16] Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 35 no. 2 (June 1991), p 213
[17] Alexander Wendt, "Constructing World Politics", *International Security,* vol. 20 (1995), pp. 77- 78

causal link motivating state behavior, it is simply regarded as insignificant for international relations. In other words, by focusing on states and the international system as the only legitimate referent objects of study (such as in the ongoing security studies debate), all other referents of study (from individual to society to religion) are either excluded as illegitimate foci of study or considered in terms of their significance for the state. As Keith Krause and Michael Williams point out, neorealism "rests on a claims regarding the appropriate reference objects of security that both insulates it from seriously engaging alternative formulations and forces the latter [new approaches] to be judged on neorealism's terms."[18] In essence, any conceptualization of religion from a neorealist perspective (even a reformulated one) necessarily implies that religion should be interpreted in terms of its implication for the state, such as how religion affects state behavior. Neorealism-- because of its state-centric starting point--can never ask what the implications of the state or the international system are for religion. Traditional realism suffers from a similar state bias. According to Hans Morgenthau, whereas the individual may be bound by moral or religious considerations, the state cannot let religious or moral concerns "get in the way of successful political action."[19] As critical theorists remind us, regarding the state and its behavior in static, given, and "objective" terms, also legitimizes its activities.[20]

In sum, it is possible to say that traditional international relations scholarship has had at least three implications for the study of religion. First, religion and other

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[18] Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon International Studies Review,* Vol. 40 no. 2 (October 1996), p. 235
[19] Hans Morgenthau, *op cit.,* p. 12
[20] See, for example, Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory" in Andrew Linklater et al eds., *Theories of International Relations* (London: MacMillan, 1996).

issues of identity have largely been *assumed* to be marginal to what international relations are. Second, emphasis on the state has excluded religion as a legitimate referent of analysis and, where considered, subordinated it to the state. Finally, focus on material forces has implied that religion simply does not matter. Thus neorealists make what can be termed a "secularization assumption". From this perspective, religion-- if it should be studied at all-- is less a social force than something benign and insignificant, resting at the level of individuals and-- in its extreme-- small groups, but never politics. But this leads to more difficult questions: foremost, what is religion and what is secularization?

Studying and Defining Religion and Politics

Religion remains one of the most elusive-- and slippery-- objects of social study. Post-Enlightenment intellectual discourse has often drawn a dichotomy between "religious" thought and secular "scientific" or knowledge. According to Williams, a distinction between faith and knowledge is rooted in liberal ideology, which has hoped that "[b]y limiting discourse to the positive, phenomenal world. . . politics and society could be freed from the conflict which emerged from non-empirical claims of individual conviction."[21] In effect, such a dichotomy has often entailed either the subjugation of either religious thought to scientific knowledge or vice-versa (thus, entailing conflict between the two) or, on occasion, religious thought and science are formulated as equally relevant, but distinct sources of knowledge. Either outcome has generally entailed some difficulty in bringing the two together.

[21] Michael C. Williams, "Identity and the Politics of Security," *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 4 no. 3 (June 1998), p. 211

It is therefore unsurprising that intellectuals have been unable to develop a widely acceptable definition of religion. A wide variety of definitions flourish. Theological definitions largely emphasize the spiritual or "irrational" component of religious belief and practice, as distinct from the non-religious aspects of life. Such definitions include Friedrich Schleiermacher's definition of religion as the "feeling of absolute dependence," Rudolf Otto's emphasis on religion as "awe, a unique blend of fear and fascination before the divine" or Mircea Eliade's focus on religion as embodied in sacred space and time.[22] Unsurprisingly, these definitions prove difficult from the perspective of the social sciences, particularly because of their divorce from social context and emphasis on aspects of life that are in some way "different" from other aspects of social reality or, even by their own definition, counted as "other-worldly."

Social scientific definitions of religion also proliferate. Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, for example, define religion as

> actions, beliefs, and institutions predicated upon the assumption of the existence of either supernatural entities with powers of agency, or impersonal powers or processes possessed of moral purpose, which have the capacity to set the conditions of, or to intervene in, human affairs. Further the central claims to the operation of such entities or impersonal powers are either not susceptible to, or are systematically protected from, refutation.[23]

It should be noted that the authors propose this definition as substantive in the sense that it defines religion, not it terms of what it does, but in terms of what it is. The problem with such a definition, particularly in my attempt to locate religion in a social space, is that religion is defined in rather vacuous terms: this definition supposes that religion can in some way be analyzed in and of itself without referent to the social

[22] Winston L. King, "Religion" in Mircea Eliade, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Religion* vol. 12 (New York, MacMillan: 1987), pp. 283-285

context in which religious actions, beliefs, or institutions operate. Yet, ironically, the definition, in its reference to "actions, beliefs, and institutions" acting within "human affairs", suggests that religion is not simply something that can be defined in and of itself, but something that is acted out in a social space.

Another type of definition is more "functional" in nature in aiming to define what religion does. For example, Clifford Geertz defines religion as

> (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4)clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.[24]

For Geertz, human beings are constantly challenged by the problem of chaos. Religion in this context provides human beings and society a means to deal with the hardships of life.

Numerous other definitions of religion also flourish. A recent piece of international relations scholarship that argued for the need to reintegrate religion in international relations scholarship similarly emphasized that religion necessarily contains faith and distinguishes between immanent/transcendent and sacred/profane.[25]

In general, what all of these approaches-- both theological and scientific-- share in common is, foremost, the idea that there is distinct and universal social phenomenon called "religion" that can be clearly discerned from other aspects of social reality. Religion, in these terms, is separate or distinct from other social phenomena: It is something "spiritual" or "sacred" that is framed in opposition to what is either "temporal," "secular" or "profane". Regardless of the exact meaning of these terms, their existence implies a dichotomous distinction, which, as numerous authors

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[23] Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, "Secularization: the Orthodox Model" in Steve Bruce, ed., *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 10- 11

[24] Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in *the Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 90

have pointed out, is rooted in Western categories.[26] Not only do Western religious and secular knowledge make similar assumptions about the world, but they do so because modern international relations, the state, and religion have common roots.[27]

This distinction is, at initial level, rooted in a theistic form of belief that distinguishes "a transcendent deity and all else. . . creator and his creation. . . God and man." [28] At a second level, Western Christianity-- in particular-- has translated these ideas into two distinct levels of social reality: the temporal and the spiritual or secular and ecclesiastic. Ultimately, the very notion of "religion" has a very specific history. As Talal Asad points out, "religion"-- far from being an objective scientific category-- is in fact the product of a specific history, which he suggests is rooted in Western Christianity, deeming a universal definition of religion impossible.[29] In other words, the very attempt to define religion is rooted in developments in Western religious, social, and political thought. That is, both Western religious and secular discourses are derived from a similar social environment. Thus, the difference between them is not as great as sometimes supposed.

In particular, the way that "religion" has been formulated reflects developments in the Post-Reformation West's *separation* of religion from power. Thus, attempts to define religion in general terms, specifically the universal attempts cited above utilizing dichotomies of religious/ temporal, largely reflect political and religious concepts rooted in the West. Indeed, these definitions suggest that there is something called religion, a "spiritual" realm that can in some way be distinguished

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[25] Laustsen and Waever, *op cit.*, p. 718
[26] See, for example, Talal Asad, *op cit.*, p. 29
[27] Daniel Philpott, "The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations, *World Politics,* vol. 52 (January 2000), pp. 206- 45; Scott M. Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Society," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies,* vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 815- 841
[28] Winston L. King, *op cit.*, p. 282

from other aspects of social reality, particularly political concepts. The most significant and common embodiment of this distinction involves the idea that there are two distinct aspects of social life: political and religious. What is important, for this discussion, is not so much how these terms can be *objectively* defined, as the idea that, both at the level of theory and practice, the two spheres can be *discerned* as *distinct* aspects of social life. The relation between politics and religion will vary significantly (from blurred boundaries in some contexts, to absolute separation in others), but it becomes increasingly common to accept the idea that the two can, at least analytically, be referred to distinctly.

The implicit implication of such a distinction is the idea that religion *needs to be* separated from politics. According to Scott M. Thomas, such a conceptualization reflects the "Westphalian presumption" that

> when religion is brought into international public life it causes intolerance, war, devastation, political upheaval, and even the collapse of the international order. . . the modern state, the privatisation of religion, and the secularisation of politics arose to limit religion's domestic influence, minimise the effects of religious disagreement and end the bloody and destructive role of religion in international relations.[30]

In similar terms, Laustsen and Waever promote "an approach that singles out the *distinctly religious* about religion" by not confusing it with (political) ideology.[31] Accordingly, they argue that the securitization of religion (an act politicization)[32] entails "impoverishing it. By using religion for political gains one denies the transcendence of the divine call."[33] That is, Laustsen and Waever's approach assumes that religion is *necessarily* and *inherently* divorced from politics. In their view, true

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[29] Talal Asad, *op cit.,* p. 29
[30] Scott M. Thomas, *op cit.*, p. 819
[31] Laustsen and Waever, *op cit.*, p. 725 (emphasis added).
[32] *Ibid*, p. 719
[33] *Ibid, p.* 726

religion has no political component. However, such a view, as I have argued, is rooted in developments in the West.

Thus, at an initial level, the issue of applying religious and political ideas to the non-West appears as an epistemological problem: an attempt to use Western phenomena and understanding to explain the non-Western world. Thus, a fundamental problem arises when one attempts to apply social categories, such as religion and politics to non-Western contexts. For example, Bernard Lewis portrays the Islamic politico-religious system in very different terms:

> we in the Western world, nurtured in the Western tradition. . . tend to make a natural error and assume that the religion means the same for Muslims as it has meant in the Western world. . . a section or compartment of life reserved for certain matters, and separate, or at least separable, from other compartments of life. . . That is not so in the Islamic world. . . .In classical Islam there was no distinction between Church and state. […]Throughout the history of Christendom there have been two powers: God and Caesar, represented in this world by *sacerdotium* and *regnum,* or, in modern terms, church and state. They may be associated, they may [be] separated; they may be in harmony, they may be in conflict; one may dominate, the other may dominate; one may interfere, the other may protest, as we are now learning again. But always there are two. . . . In pre-westernized Islam, there were not two powers but one, and the question of separation, therefore, could not arise. The distinction between church and state, so deeply rooted in Christendom, did not exist in Islam, and in classical Arabic, as well as in other languages which derive their intellectual and political vocabulary from classical Arabic, there were no pairs of words corresponding to spiritual and temporal, lay and ecclesiastical, religious and secular. It was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and then under the influence of Western ideas and institutions, that new words were found, first in Turkish and then in Arabic, to express the idea of secular.[34]

I do find difficulty in Lewis's suggestion that Christianity inherently espouses secularism, as an anachronistic interpretation of both Christianity and secularism.[35]

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[34] Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 2-3

[35] Indeed, although the idea of "two swords" existed in the medieval Church, both swords found their legitimacy in religious terms. Byzantine Christianity, in which the state subsumes the Church, also represents a distinct understanding of Christian political thought. Likewise, Christian political

Nonetheless, this passage demonstrates, at least at a theoretical level, how two taken-for-granted aspects of social reality in the West (religion and politics) may be perceived in completely different terms in a different context. In particular, there may not be two categories of religion and politics, but a singular "religio-political" social reality encompassing both, both conceptually and practically. Thus, the attempt to distinguish the two may be characterized by tension, as is often the case in Islamic contexts.

It is interesting to note that recent international relations scholarship has made similar emphasis by challenging neo-realist theories emphasis on the similarity of units and universal international structure.[36] In particular, scholars have argued that it is necessary to problematize the state as a simplistic given,[37] as indeed third world states' "lack of stateness" in Western terms[38] is often characterized by threats of internal disintegration. Thus, the application of Western processes (state-building and secularization) and institutions (state, religion, and politics) to the non-West are understood as being inherently problematic.

Thus, at an initial, purely "epistemological" level, the problem of religion and politics appears as an issue of historicity[39] or cultural variation by implying an *a priori* understanding of the way that the social world operates: in secular political terms and religious terms. That is, an argument along these lines might criticize the study of Church-State (or religion and politics) relations by suggesting that such a

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organizations, such as the contemporary American religious right, far from regarding secularism in friendly terms, often regard it as the enemy to be fought.

[36] K.J. Holsti, "International Relations Theory and Domestic War in the Third World: The Limits of Relevance," in Stephanie G. Neuman, ed., *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), p. 105

[37] *Ibid,* p. 109

[38] Ayoob, Mohammed , *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 4

[39] See, for example, Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Harvest Books, 1936).

dichotomy is inherently prone to bias by assuming that there are spheres of social reality that should in broad terms confirm to the distinction between Church and State. For example, Jeff Haynes suggests that the universal application of Western social categories is problematic because it tends to force one to perceive social reality, not in terms of the society *an sich,* but--inaccurately-- in terms of the West:

> when we think of Church-State relations we tend to assume a single relationship between two clearly distinct, unitary and solidly but separately institutionalized entities. In this implicit model built into the conceptualization of the religio-political nexus there is *one* State and *one* Church; both entities' jurisdictional boundaries need to be carefully delineated. […] In sum, the conventional concept of State-Church relations is rooted in prevailing Western conceptions of the power of State of necessity being constrained by forces in society, including those of religion.[40]

Thus, Haynes argues that the study of state-church relations is inherently biased by bringing with it assumptions about the nature of religion and politics in society. Accordingly, if our analysis concerns Church-State relations, it is nearly certain that our analysis will find social phenomena that distinguish Church and State as empirical givens, regardless if such a distinction should be drawn.

Approaches such as those of Lewis and Haynes, which demonstrate the epistemological biases of concepts such as religion and politics provide an initial starting point for our analysis. In particular, such approaches allows us to understand that both secularization and neorealist theories make similar assumptions about the nature, character, and appearance of the state by suggesting that all states will become essentially the same. Indeed, *both secularization and neo-realist theories reflect an understanding of (religious) identity and politics that is rooted in Western attempts to divorce religion from the public level of states.*[41] *The difference is rooted in the level of analysis: Whereas Waltz is interested in the international system, secularization*

[40] Jeff Haynes, *Religion in Global Politics* (London: Longman, 1998), p. 8

theory examines the domestic level of states. Wallis and Bruce define secularization as the "diminution of the social significance of religion."[42] This significance is diminished through processes of social differentiation, societalization, and rationalization.[43] These processes (as expanded in Wallis and Bruce's further analysis) suggest a positivist framework in which modern states, in the process of state-building (or modernization as sociologists refer), undergo similar linear development and become increasingly secular in character. To put this another way, identity (specifically religious identity) should become increasingly distinguished from the political realm of the state. This, in turn, would seem to confirm Waltz's notion of the similarity of states and lack of significance of identity at a public or international level along the lines of Western liberal politics. That is, both theories can easily overlook a variety of historical contexts by *squeezing* different societies into one positivist model beginning in a singular notion of pre-modern state and society and culminating in a singular modern one, more or less resembling Waltz's neutral, functionally similar state. For example, Moyser, while acknowledging "some *variations* around this basic pattern"[44] --not differences among patterns themselves-- nonetheless suggests a common, pre-modern relationship between religion, society, and state across the spectrum:

> The traditional, or pre-modern, relationship between religion and politics was one in which the two were closely integrated, one with the other. Religious beliefs and practices underpinned and entered into the heart of the political process, supporting and sustaining the exercise of power. But, by this very token political concerns also extended throughout the religious sphere, The two formed, in effect, one co-terminous set of beliefs and actions. It was a

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[41] Michael C. Williams, *op cit.*., pp. 210-211
[42] Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, *op cit.,* p. 11
[43] *Ibid,* pp. 8-9
[44] George Moyser, *Politics and Religion in the Modern World* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 13

> system in which social and political life was touched at virtually all points by religious considerations.[45]

Likewise, states are expected to develop into secular modern nation states. In the process, religion is assumed to become somehow separated from the state. The problem with such an approach is, as we shall see, less the observation that political and religious spheres are discernible aspects of social life (as these have become normalized internationally) than the implicit assumption of the inherence of these two spheres as transhistorical, universally discernible aspects of social reality. In other words, it is simply assumed that ideas of "religion" and "politics" (or church and state as they are often called) can be discerned across a broad spectrum of societies as objective and static social criteria without also understanding the ways in which each has been relationally constructed vis-à-vis the other, reflecting both a specific social arrangement and a specific history of thought rooted in the West.

Nonetheless, an epistemological approach provides *only* a partial understanding of the significance of religion and politics vis-à-vis modern statehood. For example Haynes and Lewis's arguments that religion and politics do not accurately conform to non-Western experience only partially explains religion and modern international relations by recognizing the differences of Western and non-Western experiences of religion. Thus, both correctly criticize the application of Western social categories to non-Western contexts and illustrate the ways that non-Western societies defy simplistic categorization of church and state. However, both approaches-- similar to the approaches they criticize-- run the risk of essentialization of religion and politics by suggesting that the non-West is *inherently different* from the West. For example, Haynes concludes that

[45] *Ibid,* p. 12

> In their specific cultural setting and social significance, the tension and the debate over Church-State relations are uniquely Western phenomena. . . Overleaded with Western cultural history, these two concepts cannot easily be translated into non-Christian terminologies."[46]

In similar terms, Lewis suggests that

> the very notion of a secular jurisdiction and authority. . . is seen as an impiety. . . the ultimate betrayal of Islam. The righting of this wrong is the principal aim of Islamic revolutionaries and. . . fundamentalists.[47]

In particular, both authors ignore the ways in which ideas of religion and politics have become normatively adopted in different societies. That is, both fail to accommodate the myriad ways in which religion and politics have become important components of the modern world. Despite the fact it may acquire a very different meaning in a different context, the construction of modern states has often entailed some attempt to redefine the role of religion. Religion and politics, therefore, should not be simply defined in static terms, but in terms of social change. That is, although there are problems in "translating" religion and politics into a different context, this does not mean that states will not try to translate them. In other words, both Lewis and Haynes make the common mistake of largely ignoring the possibility of social *change* through the construction of spheres of religion and politics. Although these spheres, similar to Haynes argument, will vary significantly across the board, in recent times the *existence* of such spheres has become an almost universal international norm. Both religion and state have become common means of organizing social reality even if they are both subjected to challenge by "religious fundamentalists" or do not confirm strictly the West's definitions of these terms.

Religion may not exist in "objective" terms as Haynes and Lewis point out, but it is often constructed by states and becomes equally "real". Similar to Laustsen

[46] Jeff Haynes, *op ct.,* p. 9

and Waever's argument with regard to security, I argue that religion and politics are self-referential practices: each acquires their definitions by being referred to as such, i.e., through practice.[48] In other words, it is not simply an issue if "religion" or "politics" can be defined adequately or absolutely, but rather it is equally necessary to consider the ways in which these spheres have also been constructed in the state-building process. More importantly, what are the consequences of states reconstructing and, in some cases, even creating social spheres called "religion" and "politics"? As we shall see, different states define religion in very different terms, rendering a static definition of religion nearly impossible. This thesis, thus, suggests that religion-- rather than being understood as a static and traditional component of social life-- is oftentimes something very new, which is reconstructed in the state building process and is related to but distinct from another social sphere called politics.

Toward a Constructivist Understanding of Secularization

Another difficulty with the approaches outlined above (such as those of Juergensmeyer, Esposito and Huntington) is that they largely exclusive focus on domestic variables to the exclusion of the larger context in which states operate (international system). Huntington certainly does not simply examine individual states as his interest concerns civilizational identity across states. Nonetheless, the motivating factors for his study are (supposed) preexistent religio-cultural formations that are rooted within states and societies at a local (non-international systematic) level. Haynes, while comparing states, examines differences *within* states that

[47] Bernard Lewis, *op cit.,* p. 3
[48] Laustsen and Waever, *op cit.,* p. 708

challenge a simplistic understanding of secularization. In other words, these approaches share in a common a focus on "bottom-up" mechanisms (developments rooted within states and societies that in some way affect international behavior or identity) and largely ignore "top-down" factors, which start at the level of international system and affect local identity and behavior. Roland Robertson correctly points out that while domestic variables cannot be ignored, a major impetus for religious and sociocultural phenomena is global in character.[49] Thus, while I am not suggesting that the approaches described are completely wrong, they only understand half of the complete picture: Although many of aspects of secularization at first glance appear to be intra-societal, it is equally necessary to the global systematic context in which socioreligious phenomena occur.[50] Moreover, rather than seeing "secularization" as a material process that occurs uniquely and specifically within individual states, it is more promising to understand the ways in which individual states have adopted secularization, both in terms of similarity and difference, across a wide spectrum of states.

Therefore, in order to examine both the domestic and international aspects of secularization, I will consider particular instances of secularization as a *diffused* international norm. Peter Katzenstein defines a norm as "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity."[51] From the perspective of the state, norms encourage states to act in a way similar to other states either by *constituting* a new state identity or by *regulating* state's existing identity and

[49] Roland Robertson, "Globalization, Politics, and Religion," in James A. Beckford and Thomas Luckmann, eds., *The Changing Face of Religion* (London: Sage Publications, 1989), p. 10
[50] Roland Robertson "Church-State Relations and the World System," in Thomas Robbins and Roland Robertson, eds., *Church-State Relations* (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books, 1987), p. 43
[51] Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security" in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 5

behavior.[52] Similarly, I define secularization as the attempt to construct a sperate social sphere called religion generally distinguishable from a state's political sphere. Within individual states, the ways in which political and religious spheres will be distinguished will vary significantly, but the existence of two spheres as separate social phenomena has become nearly universally accepted (with a few notable exceptions). At the international level, the divorce of religion from international behavior would, in general, confirm Hans Morgenthau's idea of a political sphere separate from other aspects of life and Waltz's idea of the similarity of states in the international system. Thus, whereas Waltz's and Morgenthau's *descriptive* portrayal of states in the international system is not necessarily wrong, the underlying conceptual explanations for such behavior as attributed by realist theories are fundamentally flawed[53] by considering states and system as static givens and failing to recognize the ways in which both system and states have been socially constructed vis-à-vis each other.

Whereas realist interpretations of international relations assume the character of the secular character of the state in given terms, I argue that it is necessary to consider the way that states have become constructed as "secular", that is, as developing concepts of a religious sphere separated from other aspects of social order. In terms of neo-realism, states are understood as acquiring a separate life in the international system from that of state's domestic political structure or identity.[54] The

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[52] *Ibid,* p. 5

[53] See, for example, Richard Devetak, *op cit.,* p. 165; Alexander Wendt, *op cit.*, p. 72; J. Ann Tickner "A Critique of Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism" in R.C. Art and R. Jervis, eds., *International Politics* (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1996), p. 19.

[54] Yet, I would argue that the idea that states are sovereign to act in any way that they deem necessary at an international level cannot be understood in strict isolation from a state's domestic context because such an assumption necessarily implies certain assumptions about the role (or relative power) of the state vis-à-vis individual, society, or religion in a given context. In particular, the state is legitimized as able to act without regard to either individual, societal, or religious concerns within the state.

development of secular states, however, is not without implications for other levels of analysis. The idea that the modern state acquires legitimacy, not in religious terms, but more commonly through "secular" appeals (such as popular sovereignty, nation, etc.) implies a relative loss of power of religious authority vis-à-vis the state. Despite the fact that such subordination oftentimes proves a source of friction in some contexts, secularization has become an important norm governing state character and behavior.

In this context, it is useful to trace the development of secularism in basic terms. Secularism is largely rooted in European ideas and experiences. Whereas Catholicism had previously been regarded as an integral component of continental values, the emergence of the Protestant Reformation, Protestant appeals to individual believers, and widespread conflict between Catholics and Protestants (most notably during the Thirty Years Wars) increasingly challenged the role of Christian churches as a means of social cohesion and encouraged the development of religious belief and identity to become increasingly perceived as a problematic issue at a public level. Domestically, increasing attempts were made to construct politics and knowledge at a public level in "empirical," material terms in order to distance society from the violence that became increasingly associated with faith.[55] At an international level, a new international politics addressed the problem of religious conflict by constructing a new international politics in which religion would cease to matter between states, especially through the development of post-Westphalian sovereignty.[56] Thus, in general, it can be said that ideas of separation between religion and politics develop alongside the evolution of the modern state. Indeed, "the [re]invention of religion, as a

[55] Michael Williams, *op cit.,* p . 211
[56] Daniel Philpott, *op cit.,* p. 213

set of privately held doctrines or beliefs, was necessary for the rise of the modern state as well as the development of modern international society".[57]

However, the development of secularism in a European context does not in and of itself explain how and why this norm has been adopted by other states, particularly those outside of a European context. There is not one simplistic reason why secularization policies and identities have been adopted. But in general, the adoption of state constraints to act a certain way. As Roland Robertson points out

> participation . . . in the world system on the basis of globewide norms concerning statehood also involves the prescription that states should be basically secular.[…] the modern global system is highly secular in character, a secularity which is strongly reinforced by the perception of the secularity of the global economy. [58]

In other words, Robertson suggests that secularization is not just one of many norms, but is an essential and defining aspect of international society. [59]

However, simply approaching secularization as a widely diffused international norm only partially explains the widespread secularization of states. That is, by biasing the norm that "works,"[60] there is a tendency to overpredict the impact of an international norm on a given state, especially by not looking at domestic factors. From the perspective of the secularization norm, it is important to recognize that secularization is not simply an all or nothing phenomenon. Indeed, some domestic phenomena that may be coded as proof of secularization may in fact predate the secularization process.[61] To put this another way, the secularization norm cannot be regarded as being adopted "merely because state behavior is observed to be consistent

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[57] Scott M. Thomas, *op cit.,* p. 821
[58] Robertson "Church-State Relations and the World System" *op cit.,* p. 45.
[59] Roland Robertson "Globalization, Politics, and Religion" *op cit.*, p. 13
[60] Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security, op cit.,* p. 485
[61] Walter A. McDougall, "Religion in World Affairs*:* Introduction," *Orbis,* vol. 42, no. 2 (Spring 1998), p. 162; Daniel Philpott, *op cit.,* pp. 208- 217; and Callum G. Brown, "A Revisionist Approach to Religious Change in Steve Bruce, ed., *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis, op cit.,* pp. 39- 40; 55-56.

with an existing international norm"[62] Rather, "international norms must be empowered in the national arena, that is, they must *change* the interests and preferences of some domestic agent"[63] -- for our purpose: the state.

States, however, do not simply adopt or refuse international norms in absolute or dichotomous terms, but rather adopt norms in accordance with their domestic context. Thus, different states will adopt norms differently. Andrew Cortell and James Davis, moreover, suggest the domestic salience of a norm as a crucial concept in understanding how norms take root at the domestic level. Several factors contribute to the domestic salience of a norm, including cultural match, national political rhetoric, material interests of domestic actors, domestic political institutions and socializing forces. Accordingly, it is possible to hypothesize that these factors will all shape the way in which secularization is adopted within the given domestic context of a state.

In these terms, a constructivist approach to secularization will have two primary-- and occasionally opposite-- consequences for the appearance of secularization within a given state. First, as Robertson points out, the participation of states in an international system necessarily encourages secularization from the "top-down". Secondly, by considering domestic structures and salience, we understand that "secularization" as diffused from the level of international norm to its adoption by individual states will differ significantly according to domestic context. Particularly, in cases in which religion retains a valuable public function,[64] the divorce of religion from public affairs is less likely to occur. To simplify, there is a dialectical relationship between domestic context and the international norm, the form largely

[62] Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda," *International Studies Review,* vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 69
[63] James T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *International Studies Quarterly,* vol. 43 (1999), p. 87 (emphasis added).

determining the degree to which the latter resonates within the state. Such a conceptualization of secularization allows one to refute the "inevitability" of secularization as Brown warns is necessary,[65] at the same time recognizing a "seemingly general trend whereby societies around the world have gradually moved away from being focused around the sacred and the numinous. […and] a certain loss of power and authority of religion in society . . . "[66]

[64] Wallis and Bruce cite "cultural transition" and "cultural defense" as two prominent examples. See Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, *op cit.,* pp. 15- 21
[65] Callum G. Brown, *op cit.,* p. 31
[66] George Moyser, *op cit.,* p. 14

CHAPTER TWO

State, Politics, and Religion in the Turkish Republic: An Overview

Introduction

Secularization, as it developed Western Europe, was a gradual process coinciding with the growth of the modern state and involving the reordering of religion (particularly, its separation from politics). The secularization of states has also become an important feature of the modern international system: The expectation that states become functionally similar at the international level also implies the reconstruction of the domestic level and reordering of religion. However, just as statehood is adopted differently across a variety of contexts, states will adopt the norm of secularization differently in terms of their domestic context.

The Turkish case is interesting for several reasons. Foremost, Turkish secularization coincides with the effort to transform the Ottoman Empire, which featured a strong "religious" (i.e., communal)[67] component, into the modern Turkish nation state. Secularization in the Turkish context is, therefore, closely related to (modern) statehood. Not only is secularization used to construct a new Turkish state identity in contrast to the Ottoman empire, but also Turkish secularism becomes an

[67] In referring to "religion" or "politics" we tend to assume "modern" definitions thereof, by which the two are understood as clearly discernible and distinct aspects of social reality: Religion is understood as an apolitical form and politics as a secular state of affair. However, the use of these is misleading and anachronistic in the Ottoman context where the two in large part did not exist as separate social phenomena. In order to make this distinction, I have adopted the term "communal" in order to describe the "religio-political" symbiosis present in the Ottoman millet system and have preferred "political" and "religious" to describe the modern distinction. Undoubtedly, I will misuse these terms to some extent both because I am situationally conditioned by a "modern" worldview, and because such a distinction is

integral part of Turkey's identity as a state. The Turkish state's approach to secularization has involved the construction of spheres of religion and politics, which-- independent of each other-- nonetheless are both derived from (i.e., are aspects of) the Turkish state. Indeed, there is no clear separation between state and religion as religious institutions largely fall under the state bureaucracy.

Nonetheless, Turkish secularism is far from a simplistic or static concept. Both continuity and change have governed Turkish state interpretations of "secularism." In terms of continuity, the Turkish state has continuously addressed the issue of fitting a society with a strong Muslim identity into a state that affirms its existence in other (i.e., secular) terms. Accordingly, state identity with regard to secularism has become a contested arena,[68] gradually modifying the bounds of religion and politics in the Turkish context. Moreover, religion has always been an issue of state concern: Not only have the constantly reconstructed bounds of religion and politics been a crucial issue in defining state identity, but the fact of the state's operation of Islamic institutions has always maintained public significance as a *means* of state identity and policy. In sum, it will be argued that, despite significant changes, an important theme of Turkish secularism throughout the republic involves the centrality of the state in legitimating both religious and political life and the state's denial of "independent" sources of social legitimacy in the practice of either religion or politics.

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not always clear (especially in the early republican period). Nonetheless, it is a fundamental point of this chapter that religion and political definition have always been subject to tension.

The Ottoman Context

The Turkish state was constructed from the remnants of the Ottoman empire. A number of studies have pointed out Turkey's myriad links with its Ottoman predecessor.[69] For our purposes, it is important to mention that the early Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire both a strong state tradition and the *question* of the role of Muslim communal identity in defining political identity.

The Ottoman empire was characterized by the presence of a strong state. According to Ali Kazancigil, the strong and centralized Ottoman state tradition was relatively unique among Islamic societies.[70] Although the Ottoman state was certainly characterized by a very strong Islamic dimension, the legal role of Islam was often moderated by the state's more pragmatic concerns.[71] Nonetheless, notions of political and religious were both derived from and intimately connected to the state.

The Ottoman empire had divided itself along communal lines (millet) that functioned as the locus of identity until the Tanzimat reforms (1840-60) legislated "a direct and identical relation between the government and each of its citizens".[72] During the reigns of the Ottoman Sultans Abudlmecit I (1839-61) and Abdulaziz (1861-76), the Ottoman state engaged in a series of reforms (Tanzimat) that attempted to separate religious authority from Ottoman legal institutions. In 1839, the state

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[68] Nilufer Gole, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites," *The Middle East Journal,* 51, 1 (Winter 1997).
[69] Erik J. Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,* vol. II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); L.Carl Brown, ed., *Imperial Legacy: Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
[70] Ali Kazancigil, "Democracy in Muslim Lands: Turkey in Comparative Perspective", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* 1 (1991), p. 349
[71] Haim Gerber, *State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective* (Albany: State University of New York, 1994), p. 76
[72] Nilufer Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey" in Augustus Richard Norton, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East,* vol. II (Berkeley: University of California Berkeley and Los Angeles Press Press, 1993), pp. 103-4

issued an Imperial Rescript, which granted security of life, honor, and property to all Ottoman citizens and attempted to implement a fair system of military conscription for all of the various millet. These reforms culminated in the Hatt-i Humayun, which promised equal treatment for all communal confessions in the eyes of the state in matters of education, state employment and justice. This also established mixed tribunals, reducing the power of regional communal authorities. [73]

Nonetheless, as Davison points out, this new restructuring of the relationship between state and individual by surpassing the role of the millet was implemented largely "from above". In particular, the large degree of European influence in these reforms disallowed identification with them at a popular level.[74] Muslim "political" sentiment at a local level continued to hold. By the turn of the century, the Ottoman empire had become increasingly reduced in size-- with the loss of most of its European territories. Earlier territorial losses in Europe (such as Greece, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria), Ottoman losses following the Balkan Wars (with the establishment of an independent Albania and the formal annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1913) and the ultimate loss of Ottoman lands in the Middle East to European mandates following the Great War, meant that the Ottoman Empire became increasingly rooted in Anatolia.

Furthermore, Anatolia had become increasingly Muslim in population, especially following the massive influx of Muslims to Anatolia from lands under former Ottoman domination in the midst of European, Christian nationalist

[73] Serif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey," *The Modern Middle East: A Reader,"* Albert Hourani et al, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993), p. 351
[74] Roderic Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," in Albert Hourani et al, eds., *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, *op cit*., p. 77

movements. By 1918, Anatolia was approximately 80% Muslim in composition; following the War of Independence more than 98%.[75]

In this context, a number of new ideologies developed in order to address the collapse of Ottomanism as a ruling ideology, including pan-Islamism, Turkish nationalism, Westernism, and pan-Turkism. These are important because they are representative of the ideas and issues that would face the new Turkish state a few years later. A number of these movements attempted to understand the links between Turkish and Muslim identity. For example, writing in 1904 Yusuf Akcura states that although anyone who professes to be a Turk can be one, Islam would still act as a unifying factor for Turks "since there are so few non-Muslim Turks. . ."[76] Yet, Islam is in itself insufficient as identity for Turks, therefore requiring that Islam be subordinated to the Turkish race.[77] Thus, Yusuf Akcura regarded Turkishness and Muslim identity as closely related.

Similarly, Ziya Gokalp, an important ideologue of the Turkish nationalist movement, emphasized social cohesion in terms of the Turkish nation, while leaving an important, yet an ambiguous role for Islam.[78] Like Yusuf Akcura, Gokalp seems to subordinate Islam to the nation. Indeed, Gokalp argues that Islamic practice can only reach its full potential for the Turkish nation, when made specific to it, i.e., by translating it into Turkish.[79] The implication is, of course, a move away from legitimacy framed in terms of a universal Muslim community. At the same time, Gokalp also seems to imply religion as an essential element of the nation: "In each person, one aim, one language, tradition, one religion. . . ./ […] Turkish son, there is

[75] Erik Zurcher, *op cit.,* pp. 171-173
[76] Yusuf Akcura, "Uc Tarz-I Siyaset," *Turkiye Gunlugu,* 31 (Kasim-Aralik 1994) , p. 13
[77] *Ibid,* p. 17
[78] Serif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey," in Albert Hourani *et al,* eds., *The Modern Middle East: A Reader, op cit.,* p. 359

where your motherland is."[80] In any case, religious identity was not regarded as something "separate" from a Turkish political community, but rather was closely connected to it.

Thus, it can be said that that Turkish notions of religion in the late Ottoman Empire and early Republic were closely connected both to state identity and politics. Thus, although I do not wish to suggest that being Turkish inherently involves Islamic practice, I would suggest that Muslim and Turkish identities are closely interwoven. Likewise, the Turkish War of Independence illustrates several ways in which Turkishness and Islam continued to maintain similar significance. First, the National Pact (Misak-i Milli-- 20 January 1920), which stated the goals of "Turkish" nationalist forces in the Turkish War of Independence, never makes reference to "Turks" or a "Turkish nation", but rather to the "Ottoman Muslim majority."[81] Second, the Nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal emphasized not the establishment of a secular Turkish nation-state, but the protection of both Anatolian Muslims and the Caliphate. For example, confronted by a fetva by the Seyhulislam that the Nationalists were rebels, the Nationalists had the muftu of Ankara issue a contrary opinion. The Nationalists also depended on the support of a variety of religious dignitaries at the local level during the war of independence. [82]

The Early Turkish Republic

The attempt to create a modern Turkish nation state from the Ottoman necessarily involved addressing the burdens of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, an

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[79]Ziya Gokalp, "*Dini Turkculuk*, p. 184
[80] Ziya Gokalp, *"*Vatan*",* p. 186
[81] See Zurcher, *op cit.,* p. 144

important aim of the new state was to distance itself from the burdens of its Ottoman predecessor, both externally (by distancing itself from Ottoman debt and the capitulations) and internally (by moving away from Islamic bases of legitimacy for politics). Founded in 1923, the early Turkish Republic, can be understood as a reconstruction of existing religious and political legitimacy through the creation of a new, secular Turkish nation-state. However, the method in which the new republican state conducted these efforts relied not on the sentiments of existing Muslim communal identity, but attempted to mold a new political and religious context.

The development of the new Turkish state can be understood in terms of "nation-building."[83] Mustafa Kemal implemented a series of reforms in the 1920s and 1930s designed at the development of a modern Turkish nation-ssecular state modeled on Western ideas and based on the idea of a unitary nation. Ultimately, the process involved in constructing a new nation state involved changing a state identity in which communal affiliation played a formative role to a "modern" state identity based on the idea of a Turkish nation.

The issue of religion and politics played a crucial role in building the Turkish nation-state. In one sense, Mustafa Kemal and the founders of the Turkish republic perceived Islam as a mixed legacy. In pragmatic terms, they recognized the dominant role of "religion" in Turkish society and religion's role as a source of social cohesion despite linguistic and ethnic cleavages. On the other hand, they understood the strength of religion at a popular level as a competing source of legitimacy for the new nation. Yet it is important to recognize that religion in the early republic was never

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[82] Martin van Bruinessen, "Die Tuerkische Republik, ein saekularisierter Staat?" in Martin van Bruinessen and Jochen Blaschke, eds., *Islam und Politik in der Tuerkei* (Berlin: Institut fuer Sozialforschung, 1989), p. 28

considered something "distinct" or "separate" from the affairs of state. Indeed, its status as a competing source of legitimacy shows the extent to which religion was regarded as equally "political" in nature.

The new state however aimed to remove the legitimacy of existing traditional religious (communal) institutions in Turkey, especially those that acted as a means of legitimating the Ottoman state and politics. The Ottoman sultanate was deposed in 1922. In 1924, the caliphate was abolished, the seyhul Islam (the highest religious figure of the state) was eliminated, and Seriat (sharia) courts and medreses (Islamic schools) were closed in the same year. Because of their links to the Ottoman past, Mustafa Kemal understood these as standing in the way of the consolidation of the new Turkish state.[84] Furthermore, Ataturk's reforms closed the Sufi brotherhoods (tarikat), which served to link ruling Islamic elite to the rural masses.

Nonetheless, Ataturk's reforms are important because they involve more than simple destruction of Islamic institutions, but also attempt to forge a new identity politics as well. Nilufer Gole points out the new Turkish state's attempt to bridge the disparity of masses and state involved a process of "social engineering". Indeed, "secularization itself became part of that process of social engineering rather than an outcome of the process of modernization and societal development."[85] In other words, secularization became both a *means* and an *ends* in creating Mustafa Kemal's envisioned state, religion and politics. That is, secularization was used both as a means of destroying the legitimacy and identity of the Ottoman system and

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[83] Ilkay Sunar, "State, Society and Democracy in Turkey" in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, ed., *Turkey Between East and West, New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power* (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 142

[84] Mete Tuncay, " Der Laizismus in der Tuerkischen Republik" in Jochen Blaschke and Martin van Bruinessen, eds., *Islam und Politik in der Tuerkei*, *op cit.,* p. 59

[85]Nilufer Gole, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey," *op cit,* p. 48

constructing a new state. At the same time, secularism became closely related to Turkey's identity as a modern state.

Turkish secularization aimed not at simply eliminating Islam, but in transforming it: ultimately "re-Islamizing" society in a way that would be both compatible with and support the new Turkish nation state.[86] At the same time, the state's discourse related to its new religious policies emphasized that, far from acting "against religion", the state's aims were to preserve it. Accordingly, Mustafa Kemal and the founders of the new state approached the issue of secularism carefully. Despite Islam no longer serving as state religion since 1928, only in 1937 was the principle of secularism officially adopted. However, in 1937, Ismet Inonu speaking on behalf of the state emphasized that this action was intended to protect religion: It was, in fact, the Ottoman Empire that had abused religion by using it for political aims. The new Turkish state would no longer subject religion to such "confusion" of religion and politics.[87] The new variety of Islam promulgated by the state stressed the religious role as one of private conscience, not a means of political legitimacy. At the same time, however, the Turkish state incorporated all Islamic institutions within it, rendering religion subservient to the state bureaucracy. In sum, the new state aimed to reform Islam in order to make it compatible with the goals of a "modern" nation-state.[88]

At the same time, the Turkish state redefined politics in a way that would maintain strict separation from religion. For Mustafa Kemal, the new republic was

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[86] Esma Durugonul*, Ueber die Reislamisierung in der Tuerkei als sozial-religioese Bewegung unter besonderer Buruecksichtigun der zwei Jahrzehnte 1970- 1990* (Frankfurt, a.M.: Peter Lang Verlag, 1995).
[87] Istar B. Tarhanli, *Musluman Toplum, "Laik" Devlet: Turkiye'de Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi* (Istanbul: Afa, 1993), p. 19
[88] Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal,* 50, 1 (Winter 1996), p. 41

framed in opposition to the personal rule of the Sultan in the Ottoman Empire.[89] The most important aim of the state involved elevating people to the level of contemporary civilization, i.e., molding the populate into a modern citizenry. Thus, Mustafa Kemal understood the role of the state not as appealing to an aggregation of interests but as embodying a singular truth understood in rational scientific terms,[90] framed in large part in reaction to religion. Thus, the development of a secular state identity was defined by state elites, not by civil societal agitation.[91]

Thus, a fundamental project in the construction of the Turkish nation state involved the construction of new and separate religious and political spheres, both of which found their roots in the state. However, in eliminating mass Islamic institutions, the new Turkish republic lacked an effective means of linking of the masses to the state in political terms as well. As Metin Heper points out: "What remained of the Islamic state was virtually eliminated, and was replaced by a notion of completely secular state. The consequence was an omnipresent state in the absence of a politically influential civil society, let alone social groups as intermediary structures."[92] Although Islamic identity continued to hold sway for a large portion of the population at the popular and rural, level, groups dedicated to the enactment of Islamic reforms lacked all resources that might enable Islam to mobilize the masses. The squashing of the Sheik Said Rebellion (1925), the removal of Islam's status as state religion, and the closing of the Liberal Party (Serbest Firka) because of provocation involving the Menemen incident in 1930, served to reinforce the idea that the new state would serve as the only source of both political and religious legitimacy.

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[89] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, U.K.: The Eothen Press, 1985, p. 64
[90] *Ibid.,* p. 51
[91]Metin Heper, "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective," *The British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 1 (1991), p. 48
[92]*Ibid,* p. 47

Nonetheless, the idea that state would implement "true" definitions of both religion and politics *for* the populace, rather than *by* the populace involved a tension, which was only partially solved by substituting the idea of populace (*volk)* with that of nation. Nationalism, thus, would replace the traditional public (political) role of religion (communal affiliation).[93] Mardin's analysis suggests that the state attempted to create the idea of a Turkish society with values separate from Islam, but which would ultimately serve as a compliment to state ambitions.[94]

Education played an important role in the construction of a new Turkish nation. To a significant extent, the new state policy aiming to disseminate state identity in secular terms among the masses occurred at the expense of Islamic institutions. The *ulema*, the cleric class which continued to exert significant influence on Ottoman education, was removed from the republic's education, ensuring that secular education would transmit state ideology. The significance of these reforms is evident in their content. Two prominent education themes, the Sun Language Theory and historical theories stressing the Hittites as early Turks, were transmitted through education. These theories are important (in their attempt to create a Turkish *ursprache* and prehistoric territorial legitimacy) by reconstituting Turkish history in nationalist terms and by bypassing Ottoman Islamic legitimacy. Similarly, intellectuals encouraged by the state (such as those belonging to the "Blue Anatolia" movement) emphasized the ancient history of Turks in terms of Anatolia.[95] The same movement, similarly, also legitimized Turkish secularism, such as by criticizing the

[93] Mete Tuncay, *op cit.,* p. 82
[94] Serif Mardin, *op cit.* ,p. 369
[95] Halikarnas Balikcisi, *Anadolu'nun Sesi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1993), p. 192

way in which religion was "stuck" to the state in Ottoman times.[96] In similar terms, newspaper writers were mandated to propagate support for state positions.[97]

Moreover, the state also attempted to transform popular and folk culture through education. Education in this sense acted as both a means of creating a new elite and, by providing education to the masses, as an attempt to narrow the ideological and identity gap between the new secular elite and Muslim masses. To these ends, People's Houses (*Halk Evleri*) were established and literacy campaigns were engaged. Since the population was largely illiterate, education in the new Latin alphabet had the effect of drawing a distinct line between old and new identity. That is, since the populace would be unable to read the material in Ottoman script, the scales would be offset in terms of secular education,[98] assuring popular absorption of ideas of religion and politics.

Thus, Kemalist political transformation involved a complete social transformation, originating in the strong, centralized Turkish nation-state. The reforms of the early republic were, in sum, an attempt to construct a new state legitimacy and identity that was distinct from the Islamic legitimacy used by the Ottoman state. This was accomplished by the construction of independent spheres of politics and religion, which were both subordinated to the Turkish state. The notion of a "Turkish nation" was appropriated to similar ends and used as a substitute for the former political role of religion. Thus, the negative connotation of the "Turk" (understood in the Ottoman period as a "peasant") encouraged by anti-tribal and anti-national Islamic theology, was transformed at the level of the state, bureaucratic elite, and mass society. Accordingly, these reforms attempted to actually change identity "from below"

[96] Halikarnas Balikcisi, *Dusun Yazilari* (Ankara: Bilgi, 1982), p. 113
[97] Mete Tuncay, *op cit.,* pp. 63-64
[98] Erik Zurcher, *op cit.,,* p. 197

though the impetus for which came "from above." In sum, the construction of the Turkish nation state and the adoption of secularization were not simply neutral processes resting at the level of the state, but necessarily affected other levels of analysis. In particular, the construction of a modern state from the Ottoman empire involved a radical restructuring of politics and religion and the creation of nationalism as a political substitute for the Islamic legitimacy of the state.

Following Ataturk's death, Ismet Inonu largely continued his predecessor's legacy. Inonu understood the state as a realm above politics aimed at guarding the long-term interest of the community by preserving national unity.[99] Along the lines of Mustafa Kemal's understanding of politics, Inonu likewise argued that religion was a particularly sensitive matter as it could be abused for political purposes and disrupt national unity embodied by the state.[100]

The Beginning of Multiparty Politics: 1946-60

Despite Inonu's argument that the state should remain above political considerations, political divergence and the emergence of a multiparty democratic system[101] involved partially reformulating secularism by redrawing the lines separating religion and politics. However, the reign of the Democratic Party in the 1950s must be understood in paradoxical terms: while representing at one level a societal reaction to the secularization policies implemented by a strong state, at another level, the DP was characterized by a similarly strong state character, revealing

[99] Metin Heper, *Ismet Inonu: The Making of a Turkish Statesman* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1998), pp. 98-99
[100] *Ibid.,* pp. 100-103
[101] see, for example, Ergun Ozbudun, "Paradoxes of Turkish Democratic Development: The Struggle Between the Military-Bureaucratic 'Founders' of Democracy and New Democratic Forces," in *Politics, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Studies,* H.E. Chehabi and Alfred Stephan, ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1995).

the extent to which Turkey's identity as a state had imprinted both political and religious life.

In 1946, Turkey began an experiment in multiparty politics with the emergence of the Democratic Party. By 1950, the Democratic Party had overwhelmingly won in both regional and general elections. Celal Bayar was elected president in 1950 and appointed Adnan Menderes Prime Minister. To a large degree, the DP capitalized on a platform based on simultaneously liberal and conservative approaches to religion. From a liberal perspective, religion did not belong to the domain of the state. By contrast, the conservatives argued that religion and social commitment were not incompatible, as religion acted as "social cement of the cohesion of society."[102] In general, the Democratic Party argued that the RPP's secularization programs were not sensitive to society taken as a whole.

The DP appealed to the religiosity of Turkey (especially the non-urban constituency from which the DP received a great deal of support) in a variety of ways. For example, the DP reverted the Islamic call to prayer to Arabic, changed the enrollment in religious education, established more schools for the training of chaplains and preachers, and increased the level of religious publication.[103] It is worth noting that although the RPP had made certain concessions toward religion in the final years of its reign (such as permitting religious instruction in secular schools) the scope and level of the RPP and DP differed significantly. Whereas the former made these concession largely in order to ensure a variety of Islam derived in terms of the state, the latter-- at least in theory-- appealed to an Islam framed in traditional, conservative, and rural terms.

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[102] Sencer Ayata, *op cit.,* p. 41
[103] Jeremy Salt, "Nationalism and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies,* 31, 1 (January 1995), pp. 13-27

Thus, the election of the Democratic Party shows how Turkish secularism continued to change according to the context of Turkish society. One way in which it is possible to understand the success of the Democratic Party is as a social reaction against the political monopoly of the state elite. Indeed, the RPP remained to a large extent suspect in the public eyes because of its singular party reign earlier decades.[104] As Ergun Ozbudun indicates: "The heterogeneous character of the DP coalition suggests that the dominant social cleavage of the era was cultural rather than socioeconomic in nature. The common denominator of the DP supporters was their opposition to state officials. In this sense, the rise of the DP was a victory of the periphery over the center".[105]

Despite this, the Democratic Party -- like the RPP-- preserved similar notions of the *state* as the center of Turkish social life. Indeed, in power the DP largely continued in the strong state character of its predecessor. For example, the DP rarely allied itself with civil Islamic organizations. Even more important, despite its appeals to mass conservatism, the DP largely continued to pursue an Islam of a rational, "enlightened" variety-- not that of the masses[106]-- thereby reflecting the continued domination of a centralized state. In other words, the modern nation state-- not Islam-- persevered as the source of legitimacy for both religion and politics.

The 1960s and 1970s

The 1960s and 1970s represent an important period in the ongoing negotiation between Turkish state and society on the definition of religion and politics. In particular, these decades witness the proliferation of a variety of ideologically based

[104] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst, 1977), p. 57
[105] Ergun Ozbudun, *op cit.*, p. 300
[106] Martin van Bruinessen, *op cit.,* p. 31

social and political groups, an important section of which allude to the political role of religion. Nonetheless, it must be mentioned that the emergence of these groups must be understood as "new" phenomena, not as simply revering to the past. In particular, these groups, though aiming to transform the bounds of religion and politics, are shaped by the bounds of the Turkish state and its identity as secular.

The 1961 constitution was-- in comparison with Turkey's other two constitutions-- the most liberal. In particular, the constitution included a full bill of civil liberties that would allow the growth of diverse range of ideological groups (including Kurdish, Islamist, and communist organizations). Moreover, the constitution also guaranteed the autonomy of the universities and mass media providing society with a free means of expression and access to information. Additionally, a series of checks and balances were initiated (such as the creation of a second parliamentary chamber and a constitutional court) to ensure that the Grand National Assembly would not go unchecked.[107] In effect, these reforms permitted the emergence and development of Islamist, Kurdish oriented, leftist, and liberal political groups.[108] Nonetheless, religion continued to be strongly linked to the state. Istar Tarhanli points out that groups both aiming for greater inroads of Islam in public life and those arguing for Islam's exclusion ironically shared the idea that Islam must continue to be linked with the state.[109] Thus, the framework of the modern nation-state persisted as the main transmitter for religion.

Already in the first elections following the coup, the center-right Justice Party-- the heir to the Democratic Party-- made a strong showing that was second only to Inonu's RPP. This standing allowed the Justice Party in the first new government

[107] Erik Zurcher, *op cit.,* pp. 256-8
[108] Nilufer Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics," *op cit.,* p. 20
[109] Istar Tarhanli, *op cit.* ,p. 29

under the new republic. Indeed, the JP led in the formation of its own government the following year. These developments are important because they show, in effect, the resilience of Turkish societal pressure on the state, ultimately leading to center-right politics being regarded as a legitimate means of political expression. Thus, Turkish politics shifted in orientation.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that the role of Islam in politics established by the efforts of the center-right and the increasing observability of Islamism in society also pressured the state bureaucracy to rethink its approach to Islam. Despite preconceptions that the 1960s might mean a reversion to pre-1946 secularization programs, Zurcher indicates that the opposite occurred: "efforts were made to cut the ground from under the feet of the Islamist current" by dedicating more attention to religion. Indeed, "[t]o combat religious bigotry, the early governments of the second republic tried to propagate a modern, rationalist version of Islam. . ."[110] particularly through its monopoly on religious education. That is, the center-right imprinted the Turkish state with an acknowledgement of the social role of religion.

In addition to the center-right, other political groups reflecting different worldviews proliferated in the 1960s. The center-right was not the only group appealing to religious sympathies. During the second part of the decade, Necmettin Erbakan, a conservative member of the JP, criticized the JP's lack of emphasis on Islam and founded the religiously oriented National Order Party. Moreover, Alpaslan Turkes, founder of the Nationalist Action Party, came to emphasize the crucial role of Islam in national identity.[111] It is also interesting to note that both Turkes's and

[110] Erik Zurcher, *op cit.,* p. 259

[111] However, it is important to note that not simply "religiously oriented" parties gained popularity during this period, as indeed the political left also gained a very large number supporters. The success of these and religious parties reflected an increasingly divided society with an equally splintered political system.

Erbakan's uses of religion, rather than representing traditional or "old" forms of religion, instead represented new ones. Particularly, Turkes's reformulation of religion as a component of nationalism differs significantly from that of Ottoman forms, essentially inverting Islam to the nation. Likewise, Erbakan's participation in modern politics (in the form of a modern political party) and his base of legitimacy (Turkish voters) represent the extent to which the National Order Party was a product of the modern Turkish state. Indeed, even the party's name (*National* Order Party) alludes to a partial adoption of the Turkish state's tropes of political legitimacy

However, it is worth mentioning that, although the military acted to close the NOP in 1971, Erbakan was, nonetheless, able to reenter politics within a short period of time by establishing the National Salvation Party, which played an important role in politics throughout the 1970s. It participated in three coalitions, one headed by the left-leaning RPP (now led by Bulent Ecevit) in 1974 and the others led by Demirel between 1975 and 1977. This participation in popular politics is indicative several important trends. First, the readiness with which Erbakan was able to reenter the political scene and his party's acceptance in the coalitions of two diverse parties show the state's greater acceptance of discussion regarding the public role of religion. This does not mean that the state officially opened to religious politics, but it does mean that religion ceased to be regarded as a "taboo" of political debate. At the same time, the NSP's representation of Islam had changed as well. Foremost, the NSP's ability to secure 11.8% of the vote by 1973 shows the popular character of Islamic politics as a societal movement. Moreover, Erbakan's cooperation with other parties shows that the NSP was able to find at least some common ground with parties on both sides of the ideological spectrum. The point is that the NSP (and its successor parties) represented less a "religious" movement, than a political one: this is especially apparent in the fact

that not traditional ulema, but engineers dominated the party platform. At the same time, important changes in the party's constituency (from rural to urban) had occurred: The state's pursuit of Import Substitution Industrialization resulted in massive urban migration, as traditionally rural segments of the population left the countryside for better urban economic opportunities.[112] By the 1970s, the NSP based its support not only on the most traditional rural segment of the population, but in the urban poor: the highest and least developed parts of the country.[113] Islamic conservatism can be understood as a response to this new urban environment.[114]

The 1980s and 1990s

The 1980s military intervention represents both continuity and change in the Kemalist state identity. On the one hand, the military intervention aimed to restore a strongly centralized and secular Turkish state. On the other hand, the military also recognized the societal role of Islam and attempted to use religion to support a secular agenda. However, both external (Turkey's limited economic resources vis-à-vis a changed world economy) and internal factors (Ozal's politics) challenged the traditional influence of the state and its relative dominance over society. Throughout the 1990s, Islamic movements have made important inroads into mainstream Turkish society. Although movements seeking to Islamize "from above" (i.e., through politics and the state) have attained some prominence, movements "from below" (i.e., by constructing a new "civil societal" space) have enjoyed greater success, in a sense, *carving* a new growing Islamically conscious space *within* Turkish society. Both

[112] Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East* (San Francisco, W.H. Freeman, 1982), p. 189
[113] Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right" in Albert Hourani et al, ed., *the Modern Middle East: A Reader* (Berkeley: University of California and Los Angeles Press, 1993), p. 637

movements, it should be mentioned, represent modern phenomena, in that they address, are framed in response to and accept the bounds constructed by the modern state. Moreover, contemporary Turkish Islamism still finds itself in a continuing dialectic between a secular state and growing Muslim consciousness (although the boundary is no longer so clear).

Similar to the previous military interventions, the 1980 coup aimed to reestablish the authority of a strong Turkish state over society and to reassert the secular nature of the Turkish state. The means by which the constitution aims to accomplish these goals, however, differs from earlier attempts by granting the president increased powers over appointment and the authority to submit to the constitutional court suits related to the constitutionality of laws.[115] Moreover, the 1982 constitution attempts to maintain the relative strength of the state while alluding to the increased autonomy of society. For example, although the 1982 constitution grants associational freedoms (e.g, trade unions) their role is clearly defined by the state, disallowing them from occupying too great a sphere of political influence.[116]

Furthermore, the constitution explicitly stipulates secularism as an immutable and permanent aspect of the Turkish state. Interestingly, however, the constitution also makes mention of "Turkish historical and moral values,"[117] thereby alluding to the societal significance of Islam in maintaining stability and social cohesion. These ideas, of course, represent a certain irony, by-- on the one hand-- referring to secular tenets and --on the other--alluding to religion as a solidifying factor in society.[118] This

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[114] Binnaz Toprak, "Surviving Modernization: Islam as Communal Means of Adaptation", *Il Politico,* no. 1 (1991), pp. 148-152
[115] Metin Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey," *op cit.,* p. 33
[116] Ergun Ozbudun, *op cit.,* p. 308
[117] in Murat Cemrek, "Ozal's Politics with Special Reference to Religion", Unpublished Master's thesis.(Ankara: Bilkent University), p. 46
[118] *Ibid*, pp. 46- 47

allusion to tradition is important because it reflects the impact of societal influence on the character of the state. Indeed, even Kenan Evren-- the leader of the National Security Council ruling Turkey after the coup and the first president of the new republic-- used Quranic verses in order to support his Kemalist understanding of a modern Turkish state. In a sense, Islam became (re)accepted as part of the nation.

An important development in this regard concerns education. Unlike in Turkey's previous constitutions, education in "religious culture and ethics" became a *mandatory*-- not optional-- course of study in 1982. Although at an initial glance, such an approach might seem to diminish Turkish secularism, this approach actually aimed to strengthen the secular state. Indeed, the implementation of religious education largely aimed to restore religious authority to the state in the face of increasing numbers of Turkish society attending private religious education, especially that provided by the Suleymancis.[119]

Writing in 1990, then Minister of Education Avni Akyol indicated that it was the obligation of the state to provide education in all regards, including religious. Religious education should present an informed, tolerant version of "our religion". "Secularism", he expands, "is not just the separation of spiritual and temporal [din ve dunya isleri]".[120] Rather, "One of the important purposes of secularism is also to prevent the misuse of religion for special goals and interests."[121] Thus, the duty of the state vis-à-vis religion was that religion not disrupt, but provide "national unity and oneness." [122]

Thus, it can be said that the state's "new" religious policies aimed to maintain the subordination of religion to the state. The greater inroads of Islam in public

[119] Istar Tarhanli, *op cit.,* p. 35
[120] Avni Akyol, *Laiklik ve Din Ogretimi* (Ankara: T.C. Milli Egitim Bakanligi, 1990), p. 10.
[121] *Ibid,* p. 11

through the state-- especially through education-- were in Evren's words "connected to secularism and against fanatic Islamism".[123] At the same time, Islam was understood as a way of fighting communism. Religion provided through the state, therefore was conceptualized to act as a unifying factor in society "in light of the principle of secularism by setting up the goal of national solidarity and unification by staying out of all political ideas and thoughts."[124] Religion, therefore, similar to previous understandings, would still maintain strict separation from politics and be subordinate to the state. According to this understanding, although religion might support the state, it could not undermine it, since state legitimacy is not based in religious terms, but rather religion finds its legitimacy through the state. Indeed, religion is a department of the state in Turkey.

Antithetically, state and society underwent important changes in the 1980s that curbed somewhat the state's ability to dominate society. In economic terms, the increasingly strapped state could no longer afford to continue its hegemony over Turkish society. The 1980s world economy was a period of massive state-downsizing and globalization.[125] The rapid urbanization that had begun in the previous decades succeeded in bringing largest portion under the influence of various forms of media. Indeed, in the post-1983, export-oriented economy, the civil society reached its greatest autonomy through the increased privatization of television and radio and the growth of civic organization, such as business associations and civil rights organizations.[126] Thus, both migration of traditional segments of the population to rural areas, the participation of their children in "modern" higher education, and the

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[122] *Ibid,* p. 10
[123] Istar Tarhanli, *op cit.,* p. 35
[124] *Ibid,* p. 36
[125] Richards and Waterbury, *op cit.*, pp. 246-255
[126] Nilufer Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics," *op cit.,* p. 36

increasing liberalization of media provided a permissive cause for the expansion of Islamism, as well as other social ideologies.

Political considerations likewise permitted such development. The Politics of the Motherland Party (led by Turgut Ozal) reflect both world economic and domestic political considerations. In particular, both Ozal's "New Vision of Development" (prepared in 1979 under Demirel) and his "Second Transformation" (1991) argued against the economic and political domination of the state over society.[127] For Ozal, Islam occupied a crucial role in transforming society. Accordingly, he favored the development of a more autonomous civil-society, that would transfer some authority of religion away from state bureaucracy to social groups.

The contemporary period has witnessed a variety of Islamic movements that have sought to Islamize Turkey both "from above" and "from below". The most important political movement is the Welfare Party (reconstituted the Virtue Party after its closure in 1998), which was until recently the largest political party in Turkey: receiving 21% of the vote, commanding one-third of the seats in parliament, controlling the local politics of the largest cities in Turkey, and even coming to power in coalition with the True Path Party. Various reasons have been cited to explain the success of the Welfare party, such as its responsiveness and inclusiveness relative to the secular parties. The Welfare party is important for a variety of reasons. First, the popularity of Welfare shows that religious issues have continued to play an important role in Turkish politics. It is worth noting that, despite its fall from power, Welfare enjoyed some success in its attempt to Islamize society "from above". In particular, Welfare has managed to gain a great deal of influence *within* certain ministries (most notably education) showing Welfare's continued attempt to transform Turkish

identity. Secondly, the example of the Welfare party is important because it shows the continued interplay between secularist and Islamist politics. In particular, despite its popularity, the Welfare party was closed in 1998 and several of its leaders (including Erbakan) were banned from further political participation. An important locus for this development occurred through military pressure, showing that a secularist interpretation of Turkish state vis-à-vis populism continues to exert important influence on policy. Moreover, it is possible to argue that this secularist understanding of Turkish politics also affected Welfare's maneuverablity in power. For example, Burhanettin Duran suggests that Refah's policies differed significantly while in opposition and when in power. Indeed, Erbakan incessantly opposed Operation Provide Comfort, criticizing Ciller for aiding Western terrorists. While in power, however, the Welfare party voted to prolong Operation Provide Comfort's Mandate.[128] Finally, since the closure of Welfare, the Virtue party has enjoyed its greatest success at the local level. One might attribute this success to Welfare/ Virtue's emphasis on grass-roots politics and as indicative of long-term Islamization occurring "from below" through the construction of a new civil-societal religious space.

Thus, it is possible to see that the greatest pressure on the Turkish state has occurred from below. Traditional secularist elites, though still exerting greater influence within state bureaucracies, no longer command absolute "symbolic capital" in Turkish society. Rather, the emergence of an "alternative" Islamist elite, favoring the greater inclusion of Islamic symbols in Turkish public life has been encouraged by both the increasing autonomy of civil society and state policies on education: Graduates of state *imam-hatip* schools (envisioned as a way of training future

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[127] Murat Cemrek, *op cit.,* pp. 58-9

[128] Burhanettin Duran, "Approaching the Kurdish Question *via Adil duzen:* An Islamist Formula of the Welfare Party for Coexistence" *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1998)

religious personnel for the state bureaucracy) have enjoyed a wide variety of higher educational success and entered a number of professional careers. Likewise, despite official bans against *tarikats* (religious orders), their numbers have proliferated in contemporary Turkey. *Tarikat* members intersect a wide section of society (from rural to urban, unskilled to professional). Some *tarikats* (most notably, the Naksibendi order) have enjoyed close relations to high state positions. Likewise, the existence of an Islamically-minded civil society no longer entails simply resistance to the state. Fethullah Gulen's *Nurcu* movement, in many senses a "modern" *tarikat*, has avoided a "political" image, but instead supported state-centric Turkish nationalism, even enjoying the support of high state leaders (such as Suleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit) against political Islamism and the Welfare-Virtue Party.[129] Indeed, legislation passed in 1991 has amended Article 163 of the Turkish criminal Code, requiring that only religious organizations calling for force be banned.[130]

Yet, more traditional interpretations of Turkish secularism also continue to hold sway. According to such an interpretation, any religious organization that attempts to exist independent of the state is, in fact, rebelling against the state. Religion outside the state's official organs is a type of political protest.[131] This shows an interesting way in which the bounds between religion and politics continue to be connected via the state. Dogu Ergil presents such an approach by emphasizing that all "outside the state-administered organization [Diyanet], there exists [no] official and independent religious organization. . ."[132] Accordingly, the very existence of *tarikats* runs counter to legitimacy framed in terms of the state: *Tarikats'* "long-term strategy

[129] M. Hakan Yavuz, "Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gulen," *Middle East Journal,* vol. 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999), pp. 593- 602.
[130] Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey," *op cit.,* p. 108
[131] Mete Tuncay, *op cit.,* p. 84
[132] Dogu Ergil, *Laiklik* (Ankara: Turhan, 1990), p. 70

is to train *tarikat* members to place them in crucial public sector ranks to influence state politics and, in the future, to capture it." In this sense, the very existence of a *tarikat* implies a political act, a violation of Turkish secularism. Therefore, it is necessary to implement "the related articles of the Criminal Code and the Constitution" which state that "religion cannot be involved in politics and the established order of the state cannot be changed in line with religious goals."[133]
In short, the existence of such groups are perceived as a challenge to a state-centric social order. It is noteworthy that the first, second, fifth, sixth, and eleventh of the National Security Council Recommendations of 28 February 1997, made similar interpretations of the development of an Islamically oriented civil society.

In conclusion, I have approached the Turkish secularization as a reflection of the idea of the state as the sole source of social legitimacy for religion and politics. Turkish Secularization in Turkey has entailed the construction of independent spheres of religion and politics, both of which--somewhat ironically-- attain legitimacy through the state. Societal pressure and socioeconomic limitations, however, have also made a deep impact on public life. Accordingly, secularism, its interpretation, and its implementation remain among the most debated issues of contemporary Turkey.

Moreover, secularization has not remained a static process. Rather, the bounds of religion and politics have constantly been reconstructed in the Turkish context. Thus, not only have the state's adoption of secularization changed according to the Turkish context, but the creation of a state-centric social order has profoundly influenced the shape of Islamic groups in Turkey. Groups seeking to Islamize Turkish society have been forced to address the bounds provided by the Turkish state. This is

[133] *Ibid,* p. 71

particularly apparent in "political Islamic" groups assuming the form of modern political parties. Likewise, the attempt to create an Islamic civil society represents the attempt to carve a space influenced by and apart from the state defined bounds of religion and politics. Thus, both movements represent modern phenomena in their reflection of the bounds of modern statehood.

CHAPTER THREE

Non-Muslims in the Turkish Republic:

Turkish Secularism as an Identity Politics

Introduction

The previous chapter explored the ways in which Turkish secularism, far from remaining a static or singular political concept, has transformed significantly throughout the history of the republic. This chapter deepens the previous argument by exploring the implications of a developing "secular Turkish" state identity for non-Muslim groups in Turkey. In particular, it focuses on the formative years of Turkish secularization (the single party period of Turkish politics, 1923- 1945) and shows the complexity of the state's adoption of the secularization norm. In particular, it illustrates the transition from a state identity based on communal-religious affiliation to one along nationalist lines and the complications contained therein.

Secularism is not simply a neutral or objective means of organizing diverse religious groups under one state structure, but rather involves the practice of a specific identity politics. That is, the construction of a new "secular Turkish" state identity has entailed complex processes of inclusion/ exclusion by defining who and -- more importantly-- who is not "Turkish". Ironically, religious affiliation has provided an important means of social cohesion vis-à-vis the Turkish state. As illustrated previously, the Turkish state's redefinition of the Anatolian Muslim millet into the Turkish nation, has entailed a process whereby being Muslim has been closely related to being Turkish. For non-Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia (particularly, Greeks,

Armenians, and Jews) the opposite has often held true: These groups have often been excluded from the Turkish nation in political, economic, and social terms. To put the issue in other terms, the Turkish state transformation of Ottoman Muslim communal affiliation into the "Turkish nation," entailed members of other millets (Armenians, Jews, and Greeks) either belonged to other nations or were remnants of the Ottoman system, either of which was contrary to identity as espoused by the modern state. Thus, despite the status of the Turkish state as "secular," religion has ironically helped to define exactly who and who is not Turkish. In sum, it will be argued that the religious affiliation of non-Muslim communities has commonly been perceived, less as a matter of simple "spiritual" preference, than as a form of national allegiance vis-à-vis the secular Turkish state.

Turkish State Identity: Muslims and Non-Muslims

The issue of what defines being "Turkish" has always been an important question in defining the Turkish state and nation. According to Bernard Lewis,

> characteristic of Turkish Islam. . . is the social segregation of the non-Muslim communities. The Ottoman Empire was tolerant of other religions, in accordance with Islamic law and tradition, and its Christian and Jewish subjects lived, on the whole, in peace and security. But they were strictly segregated from the Muslims, in their own separate communities. Never were they able to mix freely in Muslim society, as they had once done in Baghdad and Cairo. . . . One may speak of Christian Arabs-- but a Christian Turk is an absurdity and a contradiction in terms. . . a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but never a Turk. [134]

The previous chapter indeed confirms a similar conclusion, by suggesting that Muslim identity played a formative role in defining the Turkish national struggle and the question of the role of the Muslim community in defining political identity remained an important one throughout Turkish republican history.

[134] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 15

Nonetheless, it does not suffice simply to argue that being Turkish means being Muslim. To do so alludes to an essentialist interpretation of religion and identity and also overlooks the formative role of the state in defining identity. Turkishness is, in short, not something essential or absolute, but something constructed in terms of a new social, political, and religious order, i.e., the modern Turkish nation state. Likewise, the construction of identity involves more than simple affirmative elements (Turk as Muslim) but very often requires reference to who one is not, that is, in distinction to "the other".

For the purpose of this chapter, it will be argued that Turkish *state* identity has involved an affirmative component as secular Turkish. This, in turn, has attained its significance by being framed in reaction to the Ottoman Empire. In other words, the Ottoman system is, from the perspective of the modern Turkish state, the Turkish "Other". Indeed, Turkish state discourse throughout the republic significantly finds its roots in opposition to all things Ottoman. For example, the Turkish state's emphasis on a unitary and strong state structure without cleavages among various ethnic or religious communities is largely rooted against the fragmented Ottoman situation of its final years which included both special rights for foreign communities in the empire (capitulations) and strong minority activity. Similarly, the Turkish state's conceptualization of citizenship (all citizens as possessing an immediate relationship to the state as "Turks") stands in strong contrast to the Ottoman millet system, in which the religious community mediated between state and individual. The Turkish state likewise formulated religion as an apolitical sphere subservient to the state (in the form of the Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) in contrast to the Ottoman system, which--at least theoretically-- derived legitimacy in religious terms. Ultimately, it is possible to argue that the entire orientation of the Turkish state as secular, rational, modern and

Western aimed to situate the new republic in contrast to the perceived "religious", "irrational", and "oriental" monarchy before it.

The question of non-Muslim minorities posed a significant challenge to the new Turkish state. The development of a new official identity as Turkish left non-Muslims resident in Anatolia in a vulnerable situation because of the association of "Turk" with "Muslim." That is, despite the ongoing construction of Turkish state identity, older communal forms continued to survive forming the basis for not only religious identity but containing political overtones. Armenians were not simply members of a particular church, but were perceived as adherents of another nation. Thus, the presence of non-Muslims in Turkey was largely perceived as disrupting what would otherwise be a homogenous "Turkish" state. Thus, unlike Muslims who-- at least theoretically-- became accepted as potential "Turks" regardless of ethnic background, non-Muslims resident in Anatolia became classified as "minorities" or "foreigners" in Turkey, but never quite Turks.[135] This was reinforced by the autonomous status that would be granted to these minorities, which often became grounds for resentment or was perceived as an attempt to revert to the Ottoman past.

The Greek and Turkish Exchange of Populations

As a point of departure, it is useful to look at the Greek and Turkish exchange of populations as representative of Turkish attitudes of national inclusion/ exclusion. It also provides an initial glimpse into how the Turkish state perceived religious affiliation. The "Convention Between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations" was signed on 23 January 1923 and was ratified in August of the same year. The Convention called for the compulsory exchange of

approximately 1 200 000 Anatolian "Greeks" to Greece and the "repatriation" of 400 000 "Turks" resident in Greece to Turkey. A significant number of Greeks having already left Anatolia, the official exchanges began in December 1923 and finished the following year.

The population exchanges are significant because they reveal the boundaries of the Turkish state's definition of who would be considered "Turkish". [136]Despite the temptation to think of being Turkish as somehow inherent or intrinsic, the fact that both Turkish and Greek populations were largely mixed imprinted the cultures of both. Thus, neither linguistic nor geographic considerations suffice in defining Turkishness vis-à-vis minorities. Instead, the Convention appealed to religious affiliation as the defining criteria for exchange. Article 1 of the Convention states that

> there shall take place a compulsory exchange of *Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion* established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals *of the Moslem religion* established in Greek territory .[137]

It is interesting to note that the Greeks who would be exchanged were referred to as "Turkish nationals" showing the extent to which Turkish national identity was still an identity in flux. Likewise, religion became a defining criterion of who was and was not Turkish. Indeed, as Bernard Lewis points out, the "Greeks" of Karaman, though Orthodox in religion, used Turkish as their primary language. Likewise, many Muslims who spoke other languages than Turkish (such as Greek, Albanian or Serbo-Croatian) were repatriated to Turkey as "Turks" despite their incompetence in the

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[135] Ayhan Aktar, *Varlik Vergisi ve 'Turklestirme' Politikalari* (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2000), p. 137

[136] Although there is certainly an international dimension in defining notions such as "Greek or "Turk," the point of this chapter is to illustrate how a particular state (the Turkish one) adopts international identity norms (religion and politics) in a given context. This particular state, moreover, pursues policies that perpetuate and reinforce particularized and exclusive identity politics, which should not be understood as simply "neutral" processes. But rather such policies profoundly define the lives and identity of non-Muslims in Turkey. Thus, although the international dimensions of identity are important, overemphasizing the point overshadows the extent to which a particular states act as both permissive and active causes in constructing identity in its given context.

[137] "Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations" (**http://www.hri.org/docs/straits/exchange.html)**. (emphasis added)

Turkish language.[138] It is noteworthy that an exchange of Muslim populations (based on, for example, linguistic criteria) never became a subject of discussion. Ironically, religious (communal) affiliation, thus, became a defining instance of the new Turkish identity.

The only exemptions to the Greek-Turkish exchange of populations involved the Turks of Western Thrace and the Greeks of Istanbul, who would be able to remain in their respective traditional places of residence. Yet, Turkey's decision to maintain a Greek presence in Istanbul was by no means automatic. Ismet Inonu, Turkey's chief negotiator at Lausanne and later Prime Minister and President, indeed promoted the total expulsion of all Greeks as "necessary" and "logical."[139] Not only the Greeks were regarded with suspicion. Indeed, all minority groups were regarded as a cause for national disunity. For example, Dr. Riza Nur, a delegate at Lausanne, addressed the Turkish Grand National Assembly, commenting on the minority situation in Turkey:

> Now sirs, this minority issue is one of the most important issues and [the legal status of minorities] have been accepted by the National Pact. When we didn't want to accept it [at Lausanne] they forced the National Pact. And we accepted. . . [At Lausanne] we accepted the exchange of populations, [it will be done] by force. There will be no minorities left [in Anatolia any more], with the exception of Istanbul. (Protests: What about Armenians?) But friends, how many Armenians are there? (Protests: What about Jews?) There are thirty thousand Jews in Istanbul. These people have never been a source of problems until now. (Protests) As you know, Jews are the kind of people that can be guided easily. Of course, I would say it would be better if they were non-existent. .[140]

[138] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* pp. 354-355
[139] Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), p. 85
[140] TGNA secret meeting documents 1985, vol. 4, 8 in Ayhan Aktar, *Varlik Vergisi*, pp. 41-42

Thus, for example, despite significant Jewish participation in the Turkish War for Independence[141], all minorities became conflated and subject to similar prejudice. Religious identity as political identity continued to characterize the new state to an important extent.

The Treaty of Lausanne

Similar attitudes were represented at Lausanne in 1923, where the treaty finalizing the Turkish national struggle and recognizing the new Turkish state was signed. Turkish representatives at Lausanne particularly strove to consolidate the sovereignty of the Turkish state "opposing [all] restrictions inimical to the national development in political, judicial, financial and other matters"[142]-- especially the capitulations.[143] The issue of minorities was a particularly thorny one and was often perceived as granting special privileges at the expense of the power of the state. Indeed, the perseverance of communal structures were regarded as an obstacle to Turkey's creation of a nation state. Dr. Riza Nur's suggestion of Turkey's lack of a homogenous population as the reason for Ottoman disintegration is representative of larger Turkish social thought on the issue:

> The most important issue has been to save Turkey from the factors which made Turkey weak, caused rebellions, and allowed Turkey to be used by foreign states. In other words,[the most important issue] is to make Turkey homogenously Turkish. It's a difficult and unique job. It was difficult to have it accepted, even to suggest it. Thank God, they suggested it.[144]

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[141] Albert de Vidas, "The Impact of World War I on the Sephardim of the Ottoman Empire" In David F. Altabe, *et al,* eds., *Studies on Turkish-Jewish History: Political and Social Relations, Literature and Linguistics, The Quincentennial Papers* (New York: Sepher-Hermon Press, Inc., 1996).
[142] Edgar Turlington, "The Settlement at Lausanne". *American Journal of International Law,* Volume 18, Issue 4 (October 1924), p. 697
[143] The capitulations were legal and commercial privileges granted to foreign populations in the Ottoman Empire.
[144]Riza Nur, 1967: Vol. 3, 1041 in Ayhan Aktar, *Varlik Vergisi,* p. 42

Riza Nur's solution, in line with the state's policy in general, involved the homogenization of the Turkish population.

Despite this, the Turkish delegation consented in articles 37 to 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne to protect the non-Muslim populations of Turkey (namely, Greeks, Jews, and Armenians) by not only providing them equal political and social rights, but also the "right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools. . . with the right to use their own language and exercise their own religion therein".[145] In addition to the right of a minority to independently operate religious institutions and schools, the Turkish authorities also agreed to allow the practice of special family law and personal law for these minorities, that they not be subjected to Islamic law (*seriat).* Indeed, article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty stipulates that the "Turkish Government undertakes, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities."[146] Nonetheless, the perception that the new Turkish state would not have absolute legal authority over all its citizens in the form of a separate civil law for minorities continued to be regarded with suspicion, as indeed an abridgement of Turkish sovereignty. Moreover, the perseverance of religio-communal institutions including the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate despite the abolishment of the Muslim Caliphate in 1924 was often perceived as "an antithesis to the policy of turkification and secularization".[147]

[145] Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations,* p. 320
[146] *Ibid,* p. 321
[147] *Ibid,* p. 87

Secular Reforms and Minorities

In the context of state-building, the development of the Turkish secularism acts not only as a way of consolidating the new Turkish state and nation, but rather does so at the expense of existing social relations. For example, the development of a secular civil code in Turkey on 17 February 1926 was not simply a way of ensuring equality under the law for all citizens (as has sometimes been suggested). Nor did it simply occur at the expense of Islamic institutions (as outlined in the previous chapter). Instead, the adoption of a new civil code acted as a way of centralizing the authority of the new Turkish state by subjecting all citizens to the same law, particularly by eliminating the special privileges of minorities. It strengthened and the centralized the authority of the state. By itself appointing representatives to and manipulating minority councils, the Turkish state caused the Jewish, Armenian, and Greek minority groups to renounce their separate legal status as outlined in article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty. [148] According to one source, Greek representatives were imprisoned for six months until they finally agreed to relinquish their minority rights.[149] Thus, the introduction of secularism consolidated the authority of the Turkish state by significantly reducing non-Muslim influence.[150]

Thus, despite the clauses of the Lausanne Treaty aiming to protect minority communities, the Turkish state consistently aimed to consolidate its power by including minorities in larger process of secularization and Turkification. Minorities especially complained that secular reforms threatened their cultural traditions by forcing integration into an increasingly homogenized Turkish (Muslim) population.[151]

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[148] See*, Ibid,, ,* pp. 135-139
[149] Guclu Ozgan, "Lozan ve azinlik haklari." *Nokta,* vol. 19, no. 34 (26 August 2000), p. 24
[150] Ayhan Aktar, *Varlik Vergisi ve Turklestirme Politikalari,* p. 110
[151] Alexis Alexandris, T*he Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations,* p. 198

The separation of religion and politics proved particularly difficult for minorities. For example, the institution of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was separated from the Orthodox community and its function was reformulated to be "purely spiritual" in nature in the name of secularization. Other religious communities' leaders were similarly separated from their religious communities. These measures had the effect of further diminishing communities' influence vis-à-vis the state by reformulating their status as "purely spiritual" in nature, that is, as containing no political authority. In these terms, the 1935 election of a new Patriarch was subject to strong Turkish state control. The Jewish community did not even have a Grand Rabbi between 1931 and 1953. Likewise, both the Armenian and Orthodox Patriarchs were largely curtailed and subjected to Turkish state approval. Minority religious institutions, separated from the heads of religious communities, instead became subject to Turkish state bureaucracy after a 5 June 1935 legislation (which created the Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu). Indeed, the fact that religious communities legally became the *administrators* and *not the owners* of their respective synagogues and churches,[152] shows the extent to which religious legitimacy was subjected to state control and separated from the communities themselves. Likewise, the confiscation of eight Armenian Catholic Churches for not adhering to the details of the legislation show the extent to which the state subsumed all religious institutions and asserted authority over them. Interestingly, attempts were even made to "Turkify" minority religious institutions, such as the creation of a *Turkish* Orthodox Church.[153]

Minority education was subject to similar pressure. Schools were increasingly secularized and Turkified. All schools were nationalized in the early years of the

[152] Stanford Shaw, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1991), p. 268
[153] Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations,* pp. 149- 154

republic. Like all schools, religious instruction in minority schools was prohibited after 1932 in accordance with the ideology of the Kemalist regime.[154] Indeed, clergy members were even banned from even entering schools.

At the same time, schools came under increasing pressure to become "Turkish". Instruction in the Turkish language was mandated in all schools. Coinciding with more general efforts encouraging the use of Turkish by the public,[155] minority schools often encountered difficulties teaching in other languages. Jewish education occurred in Turkish, despite the previous use of French in Alliance Israelite schools. The teaching of Hebrew was also prohibited as being religious in nature.[156] Moreover, schools were often placed under the control of non-minority headmasters and were forced to accept non-minority teachers at terms and wages dictated by the Turkish state. Greeks, for example, complained that Turkish language examinations, background checks, and citizenship requirements were administered in such a way that many Greek teachers were banned from teaching.[157] In effect, simultaneous policies of secularization and Turkification of education policies weakened minorities by aiming to eliminate the most unique aspects of their identity (language and religious community).

Building a "National" Economy

Particularly suspect was the fact that minorities continued to hold a number of influential Istanbul business positions. Turkish state policies aiming to build a

[154] Avner Levi, *Turkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler* (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1992), p. 51

[155] Most important in this regard is the "Vatandas, Turkce Konus!" campaign which discouraged the use of other languages than Turkish. Some municipalities with significant minority populations attempted to forbid the use of other languages than Turkish beginning in 1937-38 (see Ayhan Aktar, *Varlik Vergisi ve Turklestirme Politikalari,* pp. 130- 131. As an aside, it is interesting to note that this campaign was not aimed only at members of religious and other minorities, but also recently arrived "Turks" from Greece, who continued their use of the Greek language in Istanbul.

"national economy" for the sake of "economic sovereignty" was often implemented at the expense of minorities. This was particularly the case because non-Muslims were regarded as belonging to another nation, i.e., despite secularization, religious identity continued to carry political overtones. For example, the "Abandoned Property Law of 20 April 1922" aimed for the state confiscation of properties whose owners had fled during wartime-- the majority of whom belonged to wealthy minority groups. This contributed to the closing of more than 110 important Greek firms and more than 20 Armenian ones between 1922 and 1923. [158] Ismet Inonu's 1922 comment that "we will not have Armenians and Greeks remaining as the means of importing corruption and disloyalty into our country"[159] shows the extent to which minorities' economic involvement continued to be held with suspicion.

Likewise, a number of economic nationalization policies aimed to transfer leadership from minorities to (Muslim) Turks. A number of public sector employers (such as banks or telephone companies) which had traditionally been dominated by minorities were not only under pressure to hire Muslim Turks, but were often forced to dismiss minority employees. Public Works Minister Fevzi Bey openly declared:

> Companies. . . must engage Turkish employees only. This does not mean that they can employ all subjects. . . indiscriminately. They must employ Moslem Turks only. If the foreign companies do no shortly dismiss their Greek, Armenian and Jewish servants, I shall be compelled to cancel the privileges under which they are authorized to function in Turkey.[160]

This statement is important because it shows the extent to which, despite official non-discrimination according to the Lausanne treaty, minorities continued to be regarded as "different" than other Turkish citizens and excluded from Turkish national

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[156] Avner Levi, *Turkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler,* p. 49
[157] Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul,* p. 133
[158] *Ibid,* p. 107
[159] *Ibid,* p. 85
[160] *Ibid,* p. 111

development programs. Their religious background translated as national difference. Accordingly, minority lawyers were often unable to practice law.[161] Drivers could not renew their licenses. Similar practice severely limited minority involvement in shipping and railroad. [162] The establishment of state monopolies (such as the alcohol monopoly in 1926) often occurred at minority expense.

Minorities were especially vulnerable because a number of them held foreign, not Turkish, citizenship. Thus, despite the fact that most resident "foreigners" had never resided elsewhere, citizenship requirements became a common obstacle preventing many residents from employment. Addressing the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1932, the Internal Affairs Minister, legitimated one such piece of legislation in the following terms:

> This law, the law that says some jobs are prohibited to foreigners, has been implemented in all sovereign states for a long time. And it is called regime d'etrangers in international law. In other words, it is the law that will bind the foreigners. We have wanted this for a long time, but the capitulations that were an obstacle to the future of development of the country prevented this. In the World War, by unilateral abolishment of the capitulations, some job were transferred to Turks, but we got the biggest right of this sort in Lausanne. At Lausanne, we transferred some jobs just to citizens." [163]

Thus, by appealing to the sovereignty of the Turkish state and the rights of citizenship, the Turkish state was able to circumvent concerns over excluding minorities because of their classification as foreigners.

Turkish Antisemitism

In this context, it is useful to observe the growth of antisemitism in Turkey. In historical terms, antisemitic occurrences in the Ottoman were relatively rare and,

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[161] *Ibid,* pp. 108-112
[162] Ayhan Aktar, *Varlik Vergisi ve Turklestirme Politikalari,* pp. 113- 118
[163] *Ibid,* pp. 121-122

where present, generally involved Christian, not Muslim attacks against Jews.[164] Accordingly, Jews often enjoyed better social relations both in the late years of the Ottoman Empire as well as the Republic. For example, Jews more than other minority groups were able to retain their rights to practice law in the republic.[165] Continuing in a similar tradition, the Turkish state, even granted asylum and academic position for 34 Jewish professors who had been expelled from the German Nationalist Socialist regime in 1933.[166]

Though still relatively rare, the early Turkish republic did observe a number of antisemitic occurrences. Although I do not wish to suggest that the Turkish state actively pursued a specifically antisemitic program, it is nonetheless possible to argue that the new state's emphasis on Turkishness and religious minorities as a "different" nationacted as a *permissive* cause in the emergence of Turkish antisemitism. Cevat Rifat Atilhan, published two antisemitic newspapers, *Anadolu* and *Milli Inkilap.* Although the former was closed, the later was allowed to publish throughout 1934. Thus, although the state did not necessarily promote such views, it did not necessarily take actions to counter them-- at a time when the state was actively pursuing an official identity politics and press censorship was a norm.

At the same time, articles in *Milli Inkilap* appealed to the new state's Turkification and secularization programs and argued that Jews could never become Turks. For example, one article stated that "we do not even anticipate that they can be Turkified, nor do we want it. As mud cannot become iron after being put in the oven,

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[164] See, for example, Stanford Shaw, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey;* Jacob Barnai, "'Blood Libels' in the Ottoman Empire of the Fifteenth to Nineteenth Centuries" in Shmuel Almog, ed., *Antisemitism Through the Ages* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1988).
[165] Avner Levi*, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler,* pp. 52-53
[166] *Ibid.,* pp. 98-99

a Jew cannot become a Turk regardless of what he does."[167] This quotation's appeal to the sense of being Turkish (us) in contrast to being Jewish (them) is particularly noteworthy and is not so different than the state's own identity policies vis-à-vis minorities. In the end, this newspaper's articles incited both an embargo against Jewish firms and physical attacks on the Jewish community of Thrace, causing more than 10 000 Jews to seek refuge in Istanbul on 4 July 1934. [168] Although Turkish state officials did renounce the violence and prosecute a number of those involved, a degree of hesitation is to be observed by the Turkish state. For example, then prime minister Celal Bayar's suggestion that "There is no Jewish problem in our country. There is no minority problem at all"[169] reveals a certain complacency with regard to policies toward minorities. Other state officials emphasized that Jews needed to remain loyal to the state (seeming to imply that they had not been). Another suggested Jews' lack of assimilation as the actual root of any Turkish' antagonism against them. [170] Moreover, although they did not in the end succeed, laws were presented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly as late as 1938 curtailing further Jewish immigration and requiring Jews to learn the Turkish language within one year or be subject to deportation-- a provision that would have applied not only to new immigrants but to all Jews.[171]

The Varlik Vergisi (Income Tax)

During the Second World War, Turkey pursued a policy of neutrality, aiming to keep out of the war for the sake of maintaining its national sovereignty.

[167] *ibid,* p. 110
[168] *Ibid,* pp. 114-115
[169] Stanford Shaw, *Turkey and the Holocaust, Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933-1945* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), p. 25
[170] Avner Levi, *Turkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler*, pp. 121- 122

Nonetheless, Turkey was adversely affected by the war. Particularly, the threat of a German invasion with forces on the Greek border s caused great economic hardship in Turkey by increasing defense expenditures. In addition, some groups actively engaged in profiteering by hoarding necessary supplies. The 11 November 1942 introduction of the Varlik Vergisi (Income Tax) sought to address these problems by decreasing the budget deficits brought on by security spending through the introduction of new tax money. For this study, the implementation of this tax is more significant. Indeed, it shows the ways in which religious affiliation continued to be regarded more than simply a spiritual preference, but as a form of national allegiance from the perspective of the state. That is, non-Muslims continued to be regarded as "different."

The Varlik Vergisi established different categories of taxation in terms of religious affiliation. Religion did not act simply as a "neutral distinction" but actually determined one's tax bracket, i.e., the amount of money one had to pay was based on one's religious communal affiliation. By far, the "M" (Muslim) tax bracket paid the absolute least, despite representing the greatest portion of the population (more than 98% of Anatolia). By contrast, the "G" (gayrimuslim= non-Muslim) tax bracket, the smallest group representing less than two percent of Anatolia, assumed the burden of the tax, paying on average more than ten times that of the "M" group. Indeed, official records suggest that "wealthy minorities" paid more than 280 000 000 Turkish Lira out of 315 000 000TL collected in total.[172] Thus, despite the state's identity as secular, this by no means meant the equal treatment of all religious groups. Religion continued to be a means of social, economic, and political distinction.

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[171]Stanford Shaw, *Turkey and the Holocaust,* pp. 24- 25

[172] Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority and Greek-Turkish Relations,* p. 233

Furthermore, the implementation of the Varlik Vergisi aimed not simply at promoting the war effort, but rather acted as a means of consolidating the Turkish nation and strengthening the state vis-à-vis minorities.[173] Not only was the tax was determined arbitrarily by tax councils (composed entirely of Turkish Muslim members), the taxpayers were unable to appeal it. Taxpayers were, moreover, required to pay the tax within 15 days with interest for late payment. Two weeks after the deadline, the individual's property was subject to confiscation for non-payment. If this did not suffice, the tax payer was then sent to hard labor camps (most notably at Askale) until the tax was paid off. Because of the severe terms of the tax, the effect for minorities was disastrous. Foremost, the tax transferred a significant number of non-Muslim firms to Muslim ownership, reflecting the Turkish state's emphasis on the building of a "national" economy, by which "national" meant Muslim. At the same time, the tax had the effect of driving out of the country a significant number of minorities because they were unable to pay.

Both the ability of the Turkish state to implement this tax and Turkish minorities' lack of successful appeal are indicative of the extent to which the development of a secular state in fact occurred at the expense of religious minorities as a whole. Prior to collecting the tax, members of various religious communities offered to pay the tax as a group as was the custom under the Ottoman empire. Prime Minister Saracoglu refused such a gesture by stating that, unlike the Ottoman Empire, "we're a [modern] state!"[174] Similar references were made to Turkish "national sovereignty" in determining the form and extent of taxes.[175] Thus, although minorities were subjected as a group to the authority of the state, minorities were unable to

[173] Ayhan Aktar, *Varlik Vergisi ve Turklestirme Politiklari,* p. 136
[174] *Ibid.,* p. 146
[175] *Ibid,* p. 146

represent themselves as such. The necessity of the tax was reinforced by a media campaign (particularly antisemitic in character, though aimed at minorities as a whole), which largely portrayed grievances as proof of an ungrateful minority clinging to its privileged Ottoman past and unwilling to live up to its obligations as citizens of the Turkish state. In a sense, minorities were placed in the precarious situation of simultaneously being expected to assimilate into the new state's identity as "secular Turkish," while being unable to because of the perseverance of older forms of identity in religious terms.

The Multiparty Years and Conclusion

To some extent, the emergence of multiparty politics in Turkey contributed in a positive way to minorities' relations with the Turkish state. The state's pursuit of more cautious religious positions after 1945, granted members of the minority religious communities a greater say in the management of religious sites. For example, after 1949, the councils managing religious foundations were no longer appointed by the state but rather elected by the minority community itself. The final years of the Republican People's Party rule and the election of a more Islamically minded Democratic Party in the 1950s at least initially meant a greater sensitivity toward religion as a whole. Thus, not only did a United States citizen become Orthodox Patriarch in 1948,[176] but also the appointment of a new Grand Rabbi in 1951 brought new life to the Jewish community (a significant portion of which continued to immigrate to Israel after 1949).

[176] Patriarch Athenagoras Kokinakis (Patriarch until 1972) was conferred Turkish citizenship upon assuming the Patriarchal throne at which point he relinquished his American citizenship. Under his reign, the office of the Patriarchate at least initially enjoyed greater international status. See Erhan Basyurt, "Patrik cizmeyi asti." *Aksiyon,* vol. 1, issue 30 (1 July 1995), pp. 25 -30.

Nonetheless, the issue of non-Muslims as "different" has continued to hold influence. Religious minorities have become especially vulnerable during times of international crisis or concern, at which point issues of us/ them become especially apparent. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of the Cyprus question between Greece and Turkey, which led to the virtual disappearance of the Greek minority of Istanbul. A riot, which some claim was encouraged by the state,[177] attacked the Greek community of Istanbul on the night of 6/7 September 1955. Seventy three churches, as well as thousands of businesses were vandalized, looted or destroyed in a single night. [178] In addition to persistent pressures on the Greek community as a consequence of the Cyprus affair, a final blow was struck in 1964 when between 30 000 and 40 000 "Hellenes" (permanent Istanbul Greek residents holding Greek-- not Turkish-- passports) were expelled from Turkey.[179] This action, however, did not only affect Hellenes: the fact that the Hellene population and Greeks of Turkish citizenship were largely intermarried also had the effect of driving out a number of Turkish citizens as well. Thus, a population of 300 000 Greeks in the early 1920s has dwindled to about 3 000 today.

Though of a lesser scope, the Greek and Armenian populations have similarly become targets during times of international crisis. For Turkish Jews, the most significant issue has concerned the issue of Israel. Despite warm Turkish state relations with both Israeli and Palestinian authorities, the emergence of a new Islamic-nationalist conscious in civil society has on occasion entailed an uncomfortable environment for Turkish Jews. A significant portion of Necmettin Erbakan's political

[177] Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations,* pp. 256-266
[178] Yet, it is important to note that not only Greeks were victimized: Armenians have also complained that they were attacked during this and lesser riots, showing the extent to which non-Muslims as a whole assumed similar shape in public eyes.

rhetoric involved antisemitic reference.[180] Similarly, the foreign Armenian organization ASALA's attacks against Turkish diplomats led to the emigration of a number of Turkish Armenians in the 1980s.

In conclusion, the development of a Turkish secular identity has proven a complex legacy for non-Muslim minorities. In essence, the Turkish Ottoman Muslim millet was transformed into two reinforcing identities. The first was a political Turkish national identity and the second was formulated as a purely "religious" Muslim identity. However, the same did not apply for non-Muslims, whose religious difference also translated into national difference. In particular, Turkish secularism in its formative period can be understood as an attempt to consolidate the strength of the state by bringing non-Muslims under the same authority as Muslims. In effect, state led programs of Turkification and secularization have not only attempted to diminish the distinctive elements of Jewish, Armenian, and Greek identity, but the connotation of Turk as Muslim has often left non-Muslims vulnerable vis-à-vis the state as evident in the examples of the Greek-Turkish populations exchanges, the building of a "national" economy, and the implementation of the Varlik Vergisi. Such programs have often left minorities in an ironic position: as simultaneously expected to assimilate, but unable to do so.

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[179] Hulya Dmir and Ridvan Akar, *Istanbu'un Son Surgunleri* (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1994), p. 12

[180] For an excellent sample of Erbakan's *Adil Duzen* (*Just Order)* which features a number of antisemitic references, see David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey* (Cambridgeshire, England: Eothen, 1999), appendix 4.

CONCLUSION

The state, I have argued, is inherently related to issues of identity. Far from the implication of Kenneth Waltz's argument that issues of identity remain a marginal concern of international relations, I have shown that the development of modern statehood at the international level has necessarily involved complex consequences at the domestic level. In particular, becoming a state involves the expectation to behave like other states by organizing issues of identity in similar form. An important norm of post-Westphalian international relations involves the idea that religious identity will not determine the international behavior of states. To put this in other terms, states are assumed to become "secularized"-- religion is expected to be separated from the identity of the state and become distinct from politics. The adoption of this norm, therefore, oftentimes involves the radical reorganization of religion in a given state, by not only reconstructing religion in terms of modern statehood, but often by constructing a new religious sphere as something separate from politics.

However, secularization as an international norm governing statehood is far from an absolute or singular concept and is adopted differently according to the domestic context of particular states. The Turkish case provides one interesting example. The foundations of Turkish secularization largely coincide with efforts to build a Turkish nation state from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. To a significant extent, religious and political lines were not clearly defined in the Ottoman Empire in the sense that religious and political communities were essentially the same (in the form of the various *millet* that composed the empire). By contrast, a prominent feature of the new Turkish state involved the effort to construct independent spheres of religion and politics, which, separated from each other, would

nonetheless both be aspects of the state. Both religion and politics were framed in terms of the state. The new form of religion promulgated by the state became apolitical in scope and individual in nature. Distinct from politics, the new variety of Islam was framed in reference to the new Turkish nation state. Ironically, however, the Turkish state's approach to religion and politics also maintained a certain degree of continuity with its Ottoman predecessor: despite the new state's construction of separated spheres of religion and politics, religion's continued connection to the state alludes to the perseverance of a single religio-political social order.

It is also important to recognize that ideas of religion and politics will not only vary from context to context, but will also vary over time within a given context. Thus, in Turkey, we see that secularization did not retain static form, but continuously evolved. By the 1950s, societal pressure had caused the Turkish state to reconsider some of its earlier secularization programs, allowing for a partial narrowing of the distance separating religion and politics. Thus, despite an occasional military intervention, Turkish politics and even the state itself had become imprinted with significant Islamic dimensions. The entrance of Islamic currents into Turkish social and political life should not be understood as a "reversion" to traditional political forms, but rather as evidence of a *new* political form. In these terms, the notion of "political Islam" (or Islamism) is a modern phenomenon by requiring the experience of modern secular statehood to make sense. Earlier Islamic communities (e.g., the Ottoman Empire) did not need to qualify Islam as "political" since they did not make a distinction between notions of religion and politics, but rather encompassed both. Only when "Islam" has been reconstructed and secularized in form as apolitical, does "Islam" need to be qualified as "political."

The adoption of secular statehood, it must also be mentioned, is not simply a "neutral" process, but often involves profound tension in the state in which it is introduced. In the Turkish context, religion's intimate connection to the sociopolitical order of the Ottoman Empire, was replaced by nationalism as political identity. However, this reordering of religion as a "private" concern necessarily occurred at the expense of existing social relations. In particular, the adoption of secularization and the replacement of religion's "political" function by nationalism involved the transformation of the Ottoman Muslim millet into the "Turkish nation." Thus, ironically, Islam became a defining aspect of secular national identity as well. Conversely, however, non-Muslims resident in Turkey were often excluded from the Turkish nation as "non-Turks." The point is that being Muslim or non-Muslim in the modern Turkish state did not simply transform into a modern "religious" identity (as "private" and apolitical), but often carried with it "political" overtones. The "religio-political" framework of Ottoman millet did not easily become simply "religious" in nature. Likewise, the development of secularization and the modern state did not simply replace existing identity structures, but were layered upon them.

Throughout this thesis, I have resisted the temptation to define exactly what religion "is." Some of the reasons for this are outlined in the first chapter, namely: notions of a universal and private religious sphere largely find their roots in Western ideas and, therefore, do not always "translate" easily into other contexts. Nonetheless, as I have shown, states have often translated religion in the state-building process, despite the tensions that are involved in doing so. Thus, rather than understanding what religion "is," a more fruitful project attempts to understand how religion continues to change. To an important extent, this has been a fundamental purpose of

thesis: to show how religion has developed and continues to be defined in relationship to the Turkish state and the tensions that this reconstruction involves.

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